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I. Introduction
In the fictional novel, Catch-22, World War II soldiers found themselves in
an impossible situation—a catch-22—when the military required them to fly
dangerous combat missions.1 The only way a soldier could escape flying perilous
missions was to claim insanity.2 But if a soldier claimed insanity for the sake of
self-preservation, then it was only logical to conclude the soldier was of sound
mind—only a crazy person would embrace the risk to life and limb.3 As the novel
said, “[i]f he flew [the combat missions] he was crazy and didn’t have to; but if he
didn’t want to he was sane and had to.”4 In 2016, Rose Mary Knick found herself
in a catch-22 when prior U.S. Supreme Court decisions, along with the Full Faith
and Credit Statute, barred her from making a Fifth Amendment takings claim in
federal court.5 Those long-standing precedents placed her in this position because
they held a plaintiff making a Fifth Amendment takings claim must first litigate
in state court.6 At the same time, the Full Faith and Credit Statute prevented a
plaintiff who lost her suit in state court from making the claim again in federal
court.7 That statute provides in part:
Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof . . . shall
have the same full faith and credit in every court within the
United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by

1

See Joseph Heller, Catch-22 56–57 (Alfred A. Knopf ed., 1961).

2

See id. at 56.

3

See id.

4

Id. at 57.

See generally Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019); see also U.S. Const. amend.
V (“[P]rivate property [shall not] be taken for public use without just compensation.”).
5

6
See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2167. The U.S. Supreme Court has held there is no violation of the
Takings Clause until a state court denies a claim for just compensation. See Williamson Cty. Reg’l.
Planning Comm’n. v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985).
7
See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2167; 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2018); see also San Remo Hotel, L.P. v.
City and Cty. of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 347 (2005) (explaining that a state court’s decision
on a just compensation claim has a preclusive effect on a subsequent federal claim under the Full
Faith and Credit Statute).
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law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession
from which they are taken.8
The conflict caused by this statute combined with recent court decisions
meant plaintiffs like Knick were unable to access the federal court system for
takings claims.9
In Knick v. Township of Scott, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed Rose
Mary Knick’s catch-22.10 To resolve Knick’s impossible situation, the Court
overruled Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank.11
Williamson County held a takings plaintiff did not have a ripe federal takings
claim until she exhausted all state procedures and the government denied her
compensation.12 In overruling Williamson County, the Knick Court reasoned that
a violation of the Fifth Amendment occurs at the moment the government takes
property without just compensation, rather than upon the government’s denial
of just compensation.13 Though seemingly a slight difference, because of Knick,
the courts no longer require a takings plaintiff to pursue a state action prior to
pursuing a federal suit.14
The Knick holding allows takings plaintiffs greater access to the federal courts
and influences forum decisions in every jurisdiction within the United States.15
However, Congress, not the courts, should have addressed the problem exposed
in Knick to avoid damaging consequences.16 Every plaintiff in the country now
has the ability to access federal courts in takings cases, but at a significant cost
to the capacity of these courts.17 In addition to the negative effect on the federal
courts, the Knick decision will result in adverse consequences for governments.18
Governmental agencies seeking to implement beneficial regulations are now
subject to constitutional claims with no way of determining in advance whether

8

§ 1738 (2018).

Leading Case, Fifth Amendment – Taking Clause – State Litigation Requirement – Knick v.
Township of Scott, 133 Harv. L. Rev. 322, 322 (2019) [hereinafter Fifth Amendment]; see Knick, 139
S. Ct. at 2167.
9

10

See generally Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2167.

11

Id. at 2179.

See Williamson Cty. Reg’l. Planning Comm’n. v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194–
95 (1985).
12

13

See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2168.

14

See id. at 2167.

See generally Fifth Amendment, supra note 9, at 322 (explaining that the state-litigation
requirement restricted access to federal courts).
15

16

See infra notes 352–71 and accompanying text.

17

See infra notes 363–71 and accompanying text.

18

See infra notes 354 – 62 and accompanying text.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2020

3

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 20 [2020], No. 2, Art. 4

350

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 20

the regulations will constitute a taking.19 Though Congress should have prevented the problem prior to Knick, an amendment to the Full Faith and Credit
Statute is still warranted to alleviate concerns and problems which will follow the
Knick decision.20
This Case Note focuses on the Knick Court’s reasoning for overruling prior
case law and describes how the Court’s reasoning was flawed.21 First, it recounts
case law which caused the catch-22 the Court addressed in Knick.22 Second, it
summarizes the facts of the case and the majority and dissenting opinions.23 Third,
it argues that the Court’s interpretation of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause
and its holding were incorrect and will cause damaging consequences.24 Fifth,
it recommends that Congress should amend the Full Faith and Credit Statute
to allow property owners to bring a claim in federal court and proposes specific
language for an amendment to the Full Faith and Credit Statute.25

II. Background
The Fifth Amendment Takings Clause of the United States Constitution
provides “private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”26 The Court has grappled with the application of this clause in
many instances.27 Specifically, in Knick, the Court addressed the moment at which
a government has violated the Takings Clause.28 Therefore, an understanding
of the Takings Clause will illuminate why the Court incorrectly interpreted the
clause in Knick.29 The Takings Clause does not create property rights; it protects
them by preventing the government from forcing private citizens to bear public
burdens alone.30 Although the Takings Clause applies to the federal government
under the Fifth Amendment, it also applies to state governments through
19

See infra notes 354–62 and accompanying text.

20

See infra notes 411–53 and accompanying text.

21

See infra notes 267–341 and accompanying text.

22

See infra notes 38 –124 and accompanying text.

23

See infra notes 125–257 and accompanying text.

24

See infra notes 267– 410 and accompanying text.

25

See infra notes 411–53 and accompanying text.

26

U.S. Const. amend. V.

See Agins v. City of Tiburon (Agins I ), 447 U.S. 255, 260–61 (1980) (“[N]o precise rule
determines when property has been taken . . . .” (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S.
164, (1979))).
27

28

See Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2170 (2019).

29

See infra notes 30 –37, 267– 351 and accompanying text.

See Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 164 (1998); Armstrong v. United States,
364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); see also Joseph William Singer, Justifying Regulatory Takings, 41 Ohio N.U.
L. Rev. 601, 606 – 07 (2015); Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, What Constitutes Taking of Property
Requiring Compensation Under Takings Clause of Fifth Amendment to United States Constitution–
Supreme Court Cases, 10 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 231, § 4 (2006).
30
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incorporation by the Fourteenth Amendment.31 The U.S. Supreme Court has held
there is a taking any time the government physically occupies private property,
regardless of the size of the occupation or how burdensome the occupation is to
the landowner.32 It has instructed that these physical occupations include things
such as cable lines, telegraph poles, and underground pipes.33 Furthermore, the
Court has previously found land use regulations may also constitute takings.34
However, the Court will not consider a regulation to be a taking unless the
regulation “goes too far.”35 In determining whether there has been a taking, courts
consider various factors such as landowners’ “investment-backed expectations”
and the character of the regulation.36 The following cases illustrate how takings
precedent has further evolved.37

A. The State-Litigation Requirement: Williamson County v. Hamilton
In Williamson County, the U.S. Supreme Court defined what constitutes
a violation of the Takings Clause.38 In this case, a developer sought approval
from the Williamson County Regional Planning Commission to develop a tract
of land.39 After the Commission approved the preliminary plat, the County
changed various zoning ordinances and the Commission asked the developer to
submit a revised plat.40 After the Commission disapproved the plat, the developer
appealed to the County Board of Zoning Appeals, arguing the original zoning
U.S. Const. amend. XIV; see Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 383–84 (1994);
Wooster, supra note 30, at § 2.
31

See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427–39 (1982);
see also John J. Constonis, Presumptive and Per Se Takings: A Decisional Model for the Taking Issue,
58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 465, 471 (1983).
32

See, e.g., St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 148 U.S. 92, 100– 02 (1893); Loretto, 458
U.S. at 430, 438.
33

Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (“The general rule at least is, that
while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized
as a taking.”).
34

Id. The question of whether a regulation constitutes a taking is one of degree and is
evaluated on a case-by-case basis. See Pa. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123–24
(1978) (“While this Court has recognized that the ‘Fifth Amendment’s guarantee . . . [is] designed
to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness
and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole,’ this Court, quite simply, has been unable to
develop any ‘set formula’ for determining when ‘justice and fairness’ require that economic injuries
caused by public action be compensated by the government . . . .”) (first quoting Armstrong v.
United States 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); then quoting Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 368 U.S. 590, 594
(1962); then quoting Armstrong, 364 at 49).
35

36

Pa. Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.

37

See infra notes 38–124 and accompanying text.

See generally Williamson Cty. Reg’l. Planning Comm’n. v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S.
172 (1985).
38

39

See id. at 177.

40

Id. at 177–79.
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ordinances should apply, and the Board agreed.41 Respondent, Hamilton Bank,
then acquired the undeveloped parcels from the developer through foreclosure
and submitted preliminary plats to the Commission for approval.42 The
Commission declined to follow the decision of the Board, stating the Board
lacked appellate jurisdiction.43 The Commission, therefore, decided it would not
evaluate the plat under the original zoning ordinance, and must, instead, evaluate
it under the new ordinance.44
Hamilton Bank filed suit, alleging the Commission’s denial constituted
a taking of “its property without just compensation.”45 After the lower courts’
disagreement regarding whether the Commission had taken the bank’s property,
the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.46 However, rather than determining
whether a taking occurred, the Court held the claim was premature because a
plaintiff must first pursue the available state procedures before bringing a claim
in federal court.47 In this case, the claim was premature because Tennessee state
law provides landowners with the ability to bring an inverse condemnation
action to receive compensation for a taking, yet Respondent did not seek relief
though that procedure.48 The Williamson County Court reasoned, if legislation
provides an adequate procedure for compensation, the claimant must use it.49
Claimants cannot make a constitutional takings claim until the government has
denied just compensation through the available state procedure.50 Therefore, the
U.S. Supreme Court held the claim was not ripe because Hamilton Bank failed to
seek compensation through the proper state procedures.51
In its decision, the Williamson County Court sought guidance from Cherokee
Nation v. Southern Kansas Railway Co., which held that the government need not
pay just compensation in advance of a taking.52 Prior to a taking, it is sufficient
41

See id. at 180– 81.

42

Id. at 181.

43

Id. at 181– 82.

44

See id.

45

Id. at 182.

46

Id. at 185.

47

Id. at 194–97.

48

Id. at 196 –97

49

Id. at 195.

50

Id.

Id. at 194–97. The Court held the takings claim was also premature because Respondent
had not sought a variance to the zoning ordinance. Id. at 186–94. Therefore, because a variance
procedure was available, Respondent had not yet received a decision on what zoning ordinance and
subdivision would apply to its property. Id. This part of the holding was not included here because
it was not at issue in Knick. See generally Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019).
51

See Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 194; see also Cherokee Nation v. S. Kan. Ry. Co., 135 U.S.
641, 659 (1890).
52
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that the property owner is entitled to “reasonable, certain, and adequate” methods
for seeking compensation.53 In Cherokee Nation, Congress passed an act allowing
the Kansas Railway Company to construct and operate a railway and telephone
line through Indian Territory.54 The Cherokee Nation did not want the railway
or telephone line on their land, so they requested an injunction; in addition,
they requested just compensation for the taking in the event the court refused
to grant the injunction.55 After the lower court denied both an injunction and a
hearing on damages, the Cherokee Nation appealed to the United States Supreme
Court.56 The Cherokee Nation argued the Act violated the Constitution because
it did not require the government to provide compensation before occupying
the land.57 However, the Supreme Court held, because the Act included
procedures for providing compensation, it did not violate the Constitution.58
Therefore, a claim for a violation of the Fifth Amendment would not arise until
the government denied the Cherokee Nation just compensation through the
procedures within the Act.59
The Williamson County Court also based its holding upon Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto, Co.60 In Monsanto, the plaintiff company brought suit claiming the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) effected a taking
of its property.61 Monsanto brought this claim without availing itself of an
arbitration proceeding first, as the Act required.62 The district court held FIFRA
was unconstitutional, and the Supreme Court reviewed the decision.63
The U.S. Supreme Court held the plaintiff ’s takings claim was premature.64
The Court explained a plaintiff would not have a takings claim if he received
just compensation through the arbitration proceeding.65 Therefore, the Court
could not determine whether the Act effected a taking of Monsanto’s property

53
Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 194 (quoting Reg’l Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S.
102, 124–25 (1974)); see also Cherokee Nation, 135 U.S. at 659 (1890).
54

See Cherokee Nation, 135 U.S. at 642.

55

See id. at 651.

56

Id. at 642, 651.

57

See id. at 658.

58

Id. at 659.

59

See id. at 658–60.

See Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n. v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194–95
(1985); see also Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1013–20 (1984).
60

61

See Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 998–99; 7 U.S.C. § 136 (2018).

62

Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1013.

63

Id. at 990.

64

Id. at 1013.

65

Id.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2020

7

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 20 [2020], No. 2, Art. 4

354

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 20

without an arbitration proceeding first.66 Only after the claimant has exhausted
the arbitration requirement may it then bring a takings claim.67
The Court held such a claim could then be brought under the Tucker
Act.68 However, because the Tucker Act was available for the plaintiff to seek
compensation, the claim was not yet ripe.69 The Tucker Act gives jurisdiction to
the Court of Federal Claims to hear certain claims founded upon the Constitu
tion; therefore, a plaintiff claiming the United States has violated the Takings
Clause can seek compensation through the Tucker Act.70 The Court held the
arbitration proceeding was simply an exhaustion requirement the plaintiff was
required to fulfill prior to bringing a claim under the Tucker Act.71 Therefore,
because the Tucker Act was available for the plaintiff to seek compensation, the
plaintiff ’s constitutional challenge to the arbitration provision was premature.72
Only after Monsanto participates in an arbitration proceeding will Monsanto’s
constitutional challenges to the arbitration provision become mature.73
After Williamson County, many courts found the state-litigation requirement was a jurisdictional rule.74 Therefore, if plaintiffs failed to avail themselves
of the relief their respective state provided, the claim was not yet ripe for the
federal courts, leaving them without subject matter jurisdiction.75 This rule
eventually evolved from a jurisdictional rule to a prudential rule, meaning, rather
than viewing the state-litigation requirement as a constitutional requirement,

66

Id.

67

See id.

68

See id. at 1019.

69

Id.

See id. at 1017–18. The Tucker Act states the “United States Court of Federal Claims shall
have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon
the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon
any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in
cases not sounding in tort.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2018).
70

71

Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1018.

72

Id. at 1019.

73

Id. at 1020.

See J. David Breemer, The Rebirth of Federal Takings Review? The Court’s “Prudential” Answer
to Williamson County’s Flawed State Litigation Ripeness Requirement, 30 Touro L. Rev. 319, 338–39
(2014). See also Bigelow v. Mich. Dep’t. Nat. Res., 970 F.2d 154, 157 (1992) (explaining under
Williamson County, if a takings plaintiff had not first sought recovery through state procedures,
the claim was not ripe and federal courts would not have subject matter jurisdiction). See generally
Reahard v. Lee Cty., 30 F.3d 1412, 1418 (11th Cir. 1994); Samaad v. Dallas, 940 F.2d 925, 934–35
(5th Cir. 1991).
74

See S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 922 F.2d 498, 502 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Ripeness
is more than a mere procedural question; it is determinative of jurisdiction. If a claim is unripe,
federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction and the claim must be dismissed.”).
75
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courts instead interpreted it as a discretionary rule.76 This change allowed federal
courts to decide whether to hear a takings case prior to the plaintiff exhausting
state remedies.77 The federal courts’ new discretion allowed some cases to escape
the catch-22, while others were still subject to the preclusion trap.78

B. The Preclusion Trap: San Remo v. San Francisco
Twenty years after Williamson County, another case laid further foundation
for the quandary exposed in Knick.79 In San Remo v. San Francisco, the U.S.
Supreme Court applied the Full Faith and Credit Statute to a Fifth Amendment
takings claim.80 In 1979, San Francisco passed the San Francisco Residential Hotel
Unit Conversion and Demolition Ordinance (HCO).81 The HCO regulated
hotel conversion by only allowing an owner to convert residential units into
tourist units if the owner obtained a permit.82 Applicants could only obtain a
permit by “constructing new residential units, rehabilitating old ones, or paying
an ‘in lieu’ fee.”83 Based upon a mistaken report, the city erroneously classified
the San Remo Hotel as a residential hotel, despite its continued use as a tourist
hotel.84 Therefore, petitioners, the owners of San Remo Hotel, had to apply for
and acquire a permit to continue its business as a tourist hotel.85 The City Plan
ning Commission issued the permit after imposing an “in lieu” fee of $567,000.86

76
See Breemer, supra note 74, at 339; see also Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2178
(2019); Horne v. Dep’t of Agriculture, 569 U.S. 513, 525–26 (2013) (“[A] Fifth Amendment
claim is premature until it is clear that the Government has both taken property and denied just
compensation. Although we often refer to this consideration as prudential ripeness, we have
recognized that it is not, strictly speaking, jurisdictional.”) (citation omitted); Stop the Beach
Renourishment, Inc., v. Fla. Dep’t. Envtl. Prot. 560 U.S. 702, 729 (2010) (holding that an argument
that a claim is unripe because “petitioner has not sought just compensation” is not jurisdictional).
“Prudential standing is a form of justiciability per se.” Standing in court, The Wolters Kluwer
Bouvier Law Dictionary, Compact Edition 1048 (Stephen Michael Sheppard, ed., 2011).
“[J]usticiability per se is an exercise of pure discretion by the court . . . .” Justiciability (Justiciable
or Non-justiciable or Non-justiciability or Prudential Rules), The Wolters Kluwer Bouvier Law
Dictionary, Compact Edition 602 (Stephen Michael Sheppard, ed., 2011).
77

See Breemer, supra note 74, at 339.

78

See supra notes 76 –77 and accompanying text.

79

See generally San Remo Hotel L.P., v. City and Cty. of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323 (2005).

80

See id. at 347; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2018).

81

San Remo, 545 U.S. at 328.

82

Id.

83

Id.

84

Id. at 328 –29.

85

Id. at 329.

86

Id.
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Petitioners filed suit in federal court alleging the HCO was a violation of
the Takings Clause both facially and as-applied.87 The district court held the
as-applied takings claim was not ripe under Williamson County.88 On appeal to
the Ninth Circuit, petitioners asked the court to apply Pullman abstention, a
mechanism which allows a party to ask the federal court to abstain so the state
court can address an underlying state law question which could potentially render
it unnecessary to address the federal law question.89 The Ninth Circuit agreed to
abstain from ruling on the facial attack on the HCO because the claim rested on
the propriety of the city’s determination of the hotel’s classification as a residential
hotel.90 Although petitioners attempted to reserve the federal questions in the state
court litigation through its request regarding Pullman abstention, it advanced
claims that appeared to touch on these federal issues.91 Despite recognizing that
petitioners had attempted to reserve the federal claims, the California Supreme
Court made the decision to analyze both the state constitution and federal
constitution congruently, upholding the HCO on its face and as-applied.92
Petitioners then returned to federal district court so it could address the
remaining federal questions.93 The federal district court held the Full Faith and
87
Id. at 330. The district court held the statute of limitations prevented the facial takings
claim from proceeding. Id. See also Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Challenges
and the Valid Rule Requirement, 48 Am. U.L. Rev. 359, 360 (1998) (“Litigants in the federal
courts can attack the constitutionality of legislative enactments in two ways: they can bring a facial
challenge to the law, alleging that it is unconstitutional in all of its applications, or they can bring
an as-applied challenge, alleging that the law is unconstitutional as applied to the particular facts
that their case presents.”).
88

See San Remo, 545 U.S. at 330.

Id. The courts use Pullman abstention if a question of state law could be resolved to render
the constitutional question irrelevant, with the understanding that the plaintiff can resume federal
litigation if the plaintiff does not receive relief in the state court litigation. See Moses H. Cone
Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 10 (1983). See generally Railroad Comm’n Tex.
v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). This practice was upheld in England v. Louisiana State Bd.
of Medical Examiners when the Supreme Court held a federal court could abstain from deciding a
constitutional question while a state court addresses a preceding state law question. See England v.
La. State Bd. Med. Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 421–22 (1964). The plaintiff may also reserve the
right to have a federal court address the remaining constitutional questions following the state court
proceedings. Id.
89

90
See San Remo, 545 U.S. at 330–31. The Court agreed to apply abstention to the facial
attack on the HCO because it was ripe at the moment the city implemented the HCO. Id.
The Court explained that the facial challenge “hinged [solely] on the propriety of the planning
commission’s zoning designation . . . .” Id. at 331. However, the Court declined to apply abstention
to the as-applied challenge regarding the HCO because it was unripe under Williamson County.
Id. Because the as-applied challenge was unripe, it was not properly in federal court and was not
eligible for abstention. See Stewart E. Sterk, The Demise of Federal Takings Litigation, 48 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 251, 280 (2006) [hereinafter The Demise of Federal Takings Legislation].
91

See San Remo, 545 U.S. at 331.

92

Id. at 332–34.

93

Id. at 334.
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Credit Statue barred the facial attack on the HCO because the California courts
interpreted the takings claims under both federal and state law.94 The court of
appeals affirmed and petitioners appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, arguing
there should be an exception to the Full Faith and Credit Statute allowing federal
courts to disregard the statute when it requires plaintiffs to bring a claim in
state court pursuant to Williamson County.95 The U.S. Supreme Court rejected
this argument, reasoning plaintiffs are not entitled to relitigate valid state-court
judgments in a federal forum.96 Additionally, federal courts would not recognize
such an exception unless Congress created one.97

C. The Timing of a Fifth Amendment Taking
Another significant case revolved around the issue of timing in relation to
the Takings Clause.98 In Jacobs v. United States, the petitioner, Jacobs, owned
property along a creek which was a tributary of the larger Tennessee River in
Alabama.99 Under the authority of Congress, the United States built a dam
across the Tennessee River, causing Jacob’s land to frequently flood.100 The
government offered settlements to Jacobs, but he was dissatisfied and brought
suit pursuant to the Tucker Act, seeking just compensation for the taking.101 The
district court found Jacobs was entitled to compensation including interest from
the date of the dam’s completion.102 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held Jacobs
could not recover interest, explaining Jacobs did not base his claim upon the
Constitution, but rather an “implied promise” to provide compensation.103 In
this situation, litigants cannot claim interest against the government unless it is
expressly stipulated by contract.104 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to

94

Id. at 334–35.

95

Id. at 335.

96

Id. at 342.

97

Id. at 344.

98

See generally Jacobs v. United States ( Jacobs II ), 290 U.S. 13 (1933).

Id. at 15. There was a second petitioner in this suit, Gunter. Id. The testator of Gunter
also owned land along this tributary and similarly brought suit under the Tucker Act. Id. Jacobs
first brought suit in the district court, the court of appeals then reversed that decision and held that
Jacobs was entitled to compensation, the two suits were then combined. Id. Only the consolidated
case is addressed in this discussion.
99

100

Id.

Id. The Tucker Act gives jurisdiction to the Court of Federal Claims to hear certain claims
founded upon the Constitution. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2018).
101

102

Jacobs II, 290 U.S. at 15.

103

Jacobs v. United States ( Jacobs I ), 63 F.2d 326, 327 (5th Cir. 1933).

See Jacobs I, 63 F.2d at 327. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals distinguished this claim
from government-initiated condemnation proceedings, in which interest is measured from the time
of the taking as a portion of the just compensation. Id.
104
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determine whether Jacobs could recover interest.105 The Court reasoned Jacobs
founded his claims upon the constitutional right to recover just compensation
for the government’s taking of his property.106 The fact the government instituted
no condemnation proceedings was immaterial to the issue of interest because the
claim was founded upon the Constitution.107 The government’s implied promise
to pay just compensation was founded in the Fifth Amendment which guarantees
the right to just compensation for a taking.108 Therefore, the Court ultimately
required the government to pay interest to Jacobs.109
The U.S. Supreme Court further explained the timing of a taking in First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles.110 In First English,
appellant, First English Evangelical Lutheran Church, purchased land along the
banks of a natural drainage channel in the Angeles National Forest.111 On this
land, the church operated a campsite called Lutherglen.112 Following a large
forest fire, a massive flood overflowed the channel and destroyed Lutherglen’s
buildings.113 In response, the County of Los Angeles passed an interim ordinance
prohibiting the construction or reconstruction of any building or structure within
the flood area.114 The church brought an action claiming the ordinance denied it
all use of Lutherglen, and sought to recover on an inverse condemnation theory.115
The California Supreme Court previously held that a court must first deem
an ordinance excessive in a declaratory relief action and the government must then
continue to enforce the regulation before the Court will require the government
to provide compensation.116 The California Supreme Court’s previous holding
effectively denied damages for any temporary regulatory taking because landowners
would be able to recover only after two things occur: (1) the court deemed the
ordinance unconstitutional and (2) the county continued to enforce it following

105

Jacobs II, 290 U.S. at 16.

106

Id.

107

Id.

108

Id.

109

Id. at 17.

See generally First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304 (1987).
110

111

See id. at 307.

112

Id.

113

Id.

114

Id.

Id. at 308. The church also sought to recover under the California statute for dangerous
conditions on property, as well as under tort law for the Los Angeles County Flood Control District
“engaging in cloud seeding during the storm that flooded Lutherglen.” Id. These issues are not
applicable to the takings claims and are, therefore, omitted.
115

116

Id. at 308– 09; see also Agins v. City of Tiburon (Agins II ), 598 P.2d 25, 29–31 (Cal. 1979).
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that determination.117 Relying on this precedent, the Superior Court of California
granted the County of Los Angeles’ motion to strike the claim, reasoning the
church should have sought declaratory relief first.118 The church appealed, but
the California Court of Appeals was obligated to follow the California Supreme
Court’s precedent, and affirmed the superior court’s decision.119
The church appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, asking it to find error in
the California Supreme Court’s decision denying compensation for temporary
takings the court later finds to be unconstitutional.120 The U.S. Supreme Court
held temporary takings are no different from permanent takings.121 It explained
that it is not an adequate remedy for a government to amend a regulation that a
court finds unconstitutional.122 If a court invalidates an ordinance, a landowner
is entitled to just compensation for the temporary taking.123 Therefore, the
Court held the ordinance deprived the church of all use of its property for
numerous years and, therefore, the church was entitled to just compensation for
those years.124

III. Principal Case
A. Factual Background
Rose Mary Knick lived in a single-family home on ninety acres of land in Scott
Township (the Township), Pennsylvania.125 Knick used the land as pasture for
various farm animals, as well as an area that included a small graveyard.126 These
backyard or homestead cemeteries are common throughout Pennsylvania.127 In
2012, the Township passed an ordinance requiring those with cemeteries on their
land to keep them “open and accessible to the general public during daylight
hours.”128 The ordinance defined a cemetery as “[a] place or area of ground,
whether contained on private or public property, which has been set apart or
otherwise utilized as a burial place for deceased human beings.”129 The ordinance
117

See First English, 482 U.S. at 308– 09; see also Agins II, 598 P.2d at 29–31.

118

See First English, 482 U.S. at 308– 09; see also Agins II, 598 P.2d at 29–31.

119

First English, 482 U.S. at 309.

120

Id. at 310.

121

Id. at 318.

122

Id. at 319.

123

Id.

124

Id. at 322.

125

Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2168 (2019).

126

Id.

127

Id.

128

Id.

129

Id.
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allowed officers who enforced the code to “enter upon any property” to discover
the presence and location of a cemetery.130
In 2013, a local officer entered Knick’s property and discovered the
cemetery.131 The officer notified Knick she was in violation of the ordinance
because the cemetery on her land was not open to the public during daylight
hours due to the fence and various boundary markers restricting access.132 Knick
sought declaratory and injunctive relief in Pennsylvania state court, alleging the
ordinance effected a taking of her property in violation of the Fifth Amendment.133
However, Knick did not seek compensation through an inverse condemnation
action which would have only awarded her compensation rather than enjoining
enforcement of the ordinance.134
In response, the Township agreed to stay enforcement of the ordinance
while the state court proceedings were pending.135 Paradoxically, the state court
declined to rule on the suit because the Township stayed enforcement of the
ordinance.136 Since the Township chose not to enforce the ordinance, Knick’s
claim for injunctive relief was rendered moot, so the parties decided to only litigate
the declaratory action.137 However, the court declined to rule on the declaratory
action after the Township argued that the court lacked equity jurisdiction.138
Consequently, Knick brought suit in federal district court claiming a violation
of the Takings Clause.139 The district court dismissed the suit citing the state-

130

Id.

131

Id.

132

Id.; see also Knick v. Scott Twp., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121220 at *2–3 (M.D. Pa. 2016).

133

Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2168.

134

Id.

135

Id.

136

Id.

137

Joint Appendix, at 31, Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019) (No. 17-647).

See id. at 33. “[T]he Township . . . [argued] that a person facing potential prosecution is
barred from having a court exercise equity jurisdiction to ‘adjudicate his guilt or innocence via a suit
to enjoin his prosecution . . . .” Id. at 32–33 (citing Pa. Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v.
Bravo Enter., Inc. 237 A.2d 342, 346 (Pa. 1968)). However, an exception exists which allows courts
to grant equity jurisdiction “if an ordinance is unconstitutional” and the plaintiff ’s property will
suffer irreparable harm. See Joint Appendix (No. 17-647) at 33; Bravo Enter., 237 A.2d at 346. In
this case, the Township argued the suit was brought to simply prevent the Township from enforcing
the ordinance and that Knick could not show the irreparable harm necessary to allow the court to
find an exception and grant equity jurisdiction. See Joint Appendix (No. 17-647) at 33. Rather,
Knick should have brought her constitutional challenge in connection with a civil enforcement
action. Id.
138

139

See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2168.
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litigation requirement from Williamson County.140 It held that because Knick
did not pursue an inverse condemnation action, she did not satisfy Williamson
County’s state-litigation requirement.141 Knick appealed to the Third Circuit,
which affirmed the lower court’s decision.142 Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari to reconsider Williamson County.143

B. Majority Opinion
In Knick, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether property owners
must first seek just compensation under state law in state court prior to bringing
a Fifth Amendment takings claim in federal court.144 The Court ultimately held
a violation of the Takings Clause occurs at the very moment the government
takes property without just compensation, thus permitting litigants to enter
federal court prior to exhausting any state court remedies.145 In so holding, the
Court overruled Williamson County.146

1. A Violation of the Takings Clause Occurs at the Time of Taking
The Knick Court first considered the exact time in which a takings
violation occurs.147 The Court stated that it has long held a violation of the
Fifth Amendment occurs at the moment a government takes property without
providing just compensation.148 Therefore, at that moment, a plaintiff has a
claim against the government for a constitutional violation.149 The Court
explained that the Tucker Act provides the procedure for bringing such a
claim because at the moment of taking, the plaintiff has a claim founded upon
the Constitution.150

Id. at 2169; see also Knick v. Scott Twp., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121220 at *14–15 (Penn.
2016). See generally Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172,
194 –95 (1985).
140

141
See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2169; see also Knick v. Scott Twp., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121220
at *14–15 (Penn. 2016).
142

See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2169.

143

Id.

Id. Chief Justice Roberts authored the majority opinion, joined by Justices Thomas, Alito,
Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. Id. at 2166. Justice Thomas also filed a concurring opinion which is not
discussed in this article. Id.
144

145

Id. at 2170.

Id. See generally Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S.
172 (1985).
146

147

Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2170.

148

Id.

149

Id.

150

Id.
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To support the notion that a constitutional violation occurs at the moment
of taking, the Court looked to Jacobs, where it previously recognized the right to
just compensation arises at the time of the taking regardless of any subsequent
remedies.151 The Jacobs Court reasoned that regardless of procedures available
under statute or promises by the government to pay, the framers founded a
claim for just compensation upon the Fifth Amendment.152 Accordingly, the
Knick Court held any state remedy must not restrict a property owner’s right
to bring a federal constitutional claim.153 The Knick Court analogized a Fifth
Amendment takings claim to a Fourth Amendment claim, explaining how a Fourth
Amendment claim for excessive force exists regardless of whether a plaintiff first
files suit in state court alleging battery.154 Likewise, a Fifth Amendment takings
claim exists at the time of the taking and a court cannot qualify the right of a
plaintiff to make that claim by first requiring exhaustion of state remedies.155 The
existence of a state procedure for a plaintiff to obtain just compensation cannot
deprive a plaintiff of her Fifth Amendment right and leave her with only state
law remedies.156 The Court ultimately held that when the government deprives
a citizen of a constitutional right, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows a plaintiff to proceed
directly to federal court.157
The Court then turned to First English to support the assertion that a Fifth
Amendment claim arises at the time the government takes property.158 The First
English Court held a plaintiff acquires the right to payment at the time of the
taking, and a landowner is entitled to payment for a temporary taking.159 In its
reasoning, the First English Court relied on a previous dissent by Justice Brennan
to conclude the government is required to compensate for both temporary and
permanent takings.160 The Court reasoned that First English adopted Justice
Id.; see also Jacobs v. United States ( Jacobs II ), 290 U.S. 13, 17 (1933) (“The [property]
owner . . . ‘is entitled to such addition as will produce the full equivalent of that value paid
contemporaneously with the taking.’” (quoting Seaboard Air Line R. v. United States, 261 U.S.
299, 306 (1923))).
151

152

Jacobs II, 290 U.S. at 16.

153

Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2171.

Id. “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. IV.
154

155

Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2171.

156

Id.

Id. This statute allows takings plaintiffs to make a claim for a violation of their rights
protected under the Fifth Amendment or any other constitutional provision. Id. at 2170. This
statute provides that any person who deprives another of a right shall be held liable for such injury.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018).
157

Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2171–72 (citing First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cty. of
Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987)).
158

159

First English, 482 U.S. at 318 –19.

Id. at 318 (comparing San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 654 (1981)
(Brennan, J., dissenting)).
160
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Brennan’s view when it held the government must provide just compensation
regardless of any subsequent governmental action.161 The Knick Court further
adopted Justice Brennan’s view when it explained a constitutional violation
occurs when the government takes property.162 Additionally, the Court likened
a Fifth Amendment taking to a bank robber who “might give the loot back, but
he still robbed the bank.”163 Ultimately, the Court explained, a constitutional
violation can occur regardless of whether compensation is available because the
compensation is merely a remedy for the violation.164 Like a bank robber who
returns the stolen money, a government that pays belated compensation is still
guilty of breaking the law.165
The Court reasoned the holding in Williamson County contravened Jacobs,
First English, and other precedent because Williamson County required a litigant to
participate in a state court proceeding before they can make a Fifth Amendment
takings claim.166 The Court further reasoned the state-litigation requirement
defeated the purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.167 The Knick majority then articulated
a new rule that plaintiffs are not required to bring an available state claim
before bringing a constitutional claim pursuant to § 1983, therefore overruling
Williamson County.168 This decision means both state and federal remedies are
available, and a claimant does not need to invoke one before the other.169
The Knick Court also argued Williamson County improperly relied on
Cherokee Nation.170 It explained Cherokee Nation and the cases which followed
are not applicable to Knick.171 The Court distinguished those cases because
they involved plaintiffs seeking equitable relief and they all held that because
compensation was available, equitable relief was not.172 The Knick Court
explained that those cases simply focused on the available remedy, not whether
a taking had occurred.173 The Knick Court reasoned, even if equitable remedies
161

Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2172.

162

Id. (quoting San Diego., 450 U.S. at 654 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

163

Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2172.

164

Id.

165

Id.

166

Id. at 2170 –73.

167

Id. at 2173.

Id. at 2172–73 (“[O]bserving that it would defeat the purpose of § 1983 ‘if we held
that assertion of a federal claim in a federal court must await an attempt to vindicate the same
claim in state court.’” (quoting Mcneese v. Bd. of Ed. for Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. 187, 373 U.S. 668,
672 (1963))).
168

169

See id. at 2171–73.

170

Id. at 2175. See generally Cherokee Nation v. S. Kan. Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641 (1890).

171

Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2175–77.

172

Id.

173

Id.
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are not available, a takings violation can still occur.174 Further, because Cherokee
Nation and its progeny are not applicable to Knick, the Court was only overruling
Williamson County.175 The Court stated each case would still have the same
result: the Court would deny a request for injunctive relief when a claim for
compensation becomes available.176 However, their claim for just compensation is
grounded upon a violation of the Fifth Amendment.177

2. The Doctrine of Stare Decisis Did Not Preclude the Knick Court
from Overruling Williamson County
The U.S. Supreme Court considered whether the doctrine of stare decisis
precluded its decision to overrule Williamson County.178 Stare decisis is the
long-standing legal doctrine that compels courts to follow precedent absent a
compelling reason not to.179 This doctrine ensures that courts implement the law
consistently and predictably.180 Courts have long adhered to previous decisions
because it is better that the law be established rather than be correct.181
The Court explained the doctrine of stare decisis is weaker in constitutional
matters because U.S. Supreme Court decisions are only changed by the U.S.
Supreme Court itself or by a constitutional amendment.182 It also recognized
several factors to consider in deciding whether to overrule a previous decision.183
The Court used the following factors to determine if overruling a past decision
was appropriate: “the quality of [its] reasoning, the workability of the rule
it established, its consistency with other related decisions, . . . and reliance on
the decision.”184
The Court found all factors weighed in favor of overruling the Williamson
County decision.185 The Court first looked at the quality of Williamson County’s

174

Id.

175

Id. at 2177.

176

Id.

177

Id.

178

Id.

See Amy L. Padden, Overruling Decisions in the Supreme Court: The Role of a Decision’s Vote,
Age, and Subject Matter in the Application of Stare Decisis After Payne v. Tennessee, 82 Geo. L. J. 1689,
1689 (1994).
179

180

See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991).

Id. (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting)).
181

182

Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2177–78 (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997)).

183

Id. at 2178.

184

Id. (quoting Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2478–79 (2018)).

185

Id.
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decision along with its consistency with other decisions.186 The Court stated
its reasoning was not only wrong, but “ill founded” because it conflicted with
many other takings decisions.187 The Court explained Williamson County
based its holding on a misinterpretation of the language of prior decisions.188
The Williamson County Court incorrectly concluded a takings violation occurs
at the moment the government denies just compensation rather than at the
moment of the taking.189 Because of Williamson County’s misinterpretation, it was
inconsistent with other decisions that held a government is obligated to provide
just compensation at the moment it takes property.190 Williamson County also
received widespread criticism from some justices of U.S. Supreme Court and
legal commentators.191 For example, the concurring justices in San Remo noted it
may not have been necessary for the Williamson County Court to hold a plaintiff
must bring a state action first.192 Next, the Court looked to the workability of
the state-litigation requirement and explained the Williamson County decision
is unworkable because it deprives many takings plaintiffs of the opportunity to
litigate in federal court, contradicting the purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.193 The
Court also justified straying from stare decisis because the justification for the
state-litigation requirement has continued to evolve.194 Finally, the Court stated
that no reliance interests on the state-litigation requirement existed; therefore,
reducing the force of stare decisis.195 Reliance interests are found when a decision
“serve[s] as a guide to lawful behavior.”196 In this case, governments did not rely on
Williamson County because, following Knick, they may still implement regulations
without being subject to increased liability.197 Rather than increasing liability
for governments, there is simply another forum option: plaintiffs may bring a
takings claim in federal court rather than solely through an inverse condemnation

186

See id.

187

Id.

188

See id.

189

See id.

190

See id.

Id. See generally Arrigoni Enter., LLC v. Town of Durham, 136 S. Ct. 1409 (2016)
(Thomas, J., dissenting); San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and Cty. of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323,
348 (2005) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); Barry Friedman, Under the Law of Federal Jurisdiction:
Allocating Cases Between Federal and State Courts, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 1211, 1264 (2004); Thomas
W. Merrill, Anticipatory Remedies for Takings, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 1630, 1647– 49 (2015); Henry
Paul Monaghan, State Law Wrongs, State Law Remedies, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 86 Colum.
L. Rev. 979, 989 (1986).
191

192

See San Remo, 545 U.S. at 348–49 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).

193

See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2178 –79.

194

See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2178.

195

Id. at 2179.

196

Id. (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 521 (1995)).

197

Id.
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action in state court.198 The Court also posited that allowing suit in federal court
will not lead federal courts to invalidate more regulations because injunctive relief
will not be available as long as plaintiffs can seek compensation.199 Therefore,
because the plaintiffs can seek compensation through a takings claim brought
under the Tucker Act, federal courts will not enjoin those regulations.200 For these
reasons, the majority concluded that it was justified in overruling Williamson
County despite the doctrine of stare decisis.201 The result of the Court’s overruling
of Williamson County thus allows all takings plaintiffs to proceed directly to
federal court.202

C. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Kagan, joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, and Justice
Sotomayor, argued the Takings Clause should not be read to indicate a violation
occurs immediately upon a taking without just compensation; rather, a violation
occurs upon the government’s denial of just compensation.203 The dissent
also highlighted the likely consequence that multitudes of state officials will
unwittingly become constitutional violators.204 It further extrapolated that the
majority’s interpretation will result in an increase in the number of federal court
cases which are better suited for state court.205 Finally, the dissent rejected the
majority’s conclusion that overruling Williamson County was justified in spite of
stare decisis.206

1. A Violation of the Takings Clause Does Not Occur at the Time
of Taking
The dissent first looked at the plain language of the Fifth Amendment and
emphasized a takings claim requires two elements.207 First, there must be a taking

198

Id.

199

Id.

200

Id.

201

Id.; see also supra notes 182–200 and accompanying text.

202

See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2179.

See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2182–83 (Kagan, J., dissenting); see infra notes 207–32 and
accompanying text.
203

Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2187 (Kagan, J., dissenting); see infra notes 236–41 and accompa
nying text.
204

Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2187 (Kagan, J., dissenting); see infra notes 242–47 and accompa
nying text.
205

206
Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2189–90 (Kagan, J., dissenting); see infra notes 248–57 and
accompanying text.
207

Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2181 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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of property, and second, there must be a denial of just compensation.208 Using
this principle, the dissent demonstrated the error in the majority’s analogy to the
Fourth Amendment.209 It contrasted the two amendments by first explaining that
if an officer uses excessive force, the victim experiences a constitutional violation
regardless of whether he recovers damages because recovery is not an element of a
Fourth Amendment claim.210 Without qualification, the Constitution forbids the
use of excessive force.211 However, the Constitution does not prohibit the taking
of land, it instead prohibits the taking of land without just compensation.212
The dissent further explained the Takings Clause only requires the government
make available a “reasonable, certain and adequate provision for obtaining
compensation.”213 Courts have generally found compensation to be adequate if
there is a statutory right to obtain that compensation from the government.214
Therefore, the dissent argued that the government had not yet violated the
Constitution because Knick did not seek compensation through the available
state procedure.215 Furthermore, Knick did not argue that Pennsylvania’s inverse
condemnation proceeding was inadequate; therefore, her claim was premature
and she should have brought an inverse condemnation proceeding before making
a claim in federal court.216 Thus, a contrary holding does not defeat the purpose
of 42 U.S.C § 1983, which allows a plaintiff to bring suit if one of their rights
is deprived, because Knick was not deprived of constitutional right yet.217 In
sum, the dissent concluded the government does not commit a violation until it
denies just compensation, and only at that point may plaintiffs raise a claim under
§ 1983.218
The dissent also rejected the majority’s view that a Tucker Act claim is the
process by which a plaintiff makes a claim for a Fifth Amendment violation.219
The dissent argued that, rather, it is the equivalent of an inverse condemnation
claim which a plaintiff could make under state law.220 All the Tucker Act does is
208

Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting).

209

Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting).

210

Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting).

211

Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting).

212

Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting)

Id. at 2182 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting Cherokee Nation v. S. Kan. Ry. Co., 135 U.S.
641, 659 (1890)).
213

Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting). See generally Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18,
20–21 (1940); Williams v. Parker, 188 U.S. 491, 502 (1903).
214

215

Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2183 (Kagan, J., dissenting).

216

Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting).

217

Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018).

218

Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2183 (Kagan, J., dissenting).

219

Id. at 2186 (Kagan, J., dissenting).

220

Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2020

21

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 20 [2020], No. 2, Art. 4

368

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 20

provide a method for an owner to seek compensation for taken property.221 Unlike
the majority, the dissent felt the Tucker Act affords property owners a reasonably
sufficient mechanism to obtain just compensation.222 The availability of the
Tucker Act, therefore, precludes a claim of a takings violation until a litigant has
availed herself of its provisions and the government denies just compensation.223
Finally, the dissent specifically addressed the question regarding what moment
the government has violated the Takings Clause by denying a property owner just
compensation.224 It noted the Supreme Court’s precedent that the government
need not pay compensation prior to a taking as long as a procedure is available
to obtain just compensation.225 It explained the Court first held pre-deprivation
compensation was not required in Cherokee Nation, and subsequent cases affirmed
that principle.226 The dissent then explained how the Williamson County Court
also based its decision upon this principle that the government need not pay
compensation prior to a taking, so long as the government provides a property
owner with a mechanism for obtaining just compensation.227 Thus, the dissent
pointed out that Williamson County properly held there was not a takings violation
because there was an adequate procedure for obtaining just compensation.228
Furthermore, Williamson County held plaintiffs cannot bring an action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 before seeking compensation through the state procedure.229 The
dissent further clarified a plaintiff can only bring a § 1983 claim if the plaintiff
alleges a constitutional violation.230 In Knick, Pennsylvania’s inverse condemnation
proceeding was an adequate procedure for obtaining compensation.231 Therefore,
because it was available, the government had not yet violated the Constitution
and there was not yet an actionable claim under § 1983.232

221

Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting).

222

Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting).

223

Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting).

224

Id. at 2181– 82 (Kagan, J., dissenting).

225

Id. at 2182 (Kagan, J., dissenting).

Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The Takings Clause does not demand ‘that compensation
should be made previous to the taking’ so long as ‘adequate means [are] provided for a reasonably
just and prompt ascertainment and payment of the compensation.’” (quoting Crozier v. Fried.
Krupp Aktiengesellschaft, 224 U.S. 290, 306 (1912))). See also Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co.,
309 U.S. 18, 20–21 (1940); Williams v. Parker, 188 U.S. 491, 502 (1903).
226

227

Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2182–83 (Kagan, J., dissenting).

228

Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting).

229

Id. at 2183 (Kagan, J., dissenting).

230

Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting).

231

Id.

232

Id. at 2182 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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2. Damaging Consequences
The dissent highlighted two consequences which will likely result from
Knick.233 First, government officials will inevitably become constitutional
violators.234 Second, litigants will fill federal courts with questions which state
courts are more suited to address.235
The former problem arises because there is no method for determining
whether a regulation will constitute a taking.236 Therefore, legislative or
administrative bodies will not know whether a law or regulation will constitute a
taking prior to passing it.237 Until the majority’s decision, governmental officials
could enforce regulations without inevitably violating the Constitution.238 Even
if a court later found a regulation to be a taking, so long as the government
had provided a method for property owners to obtain just compensation, the
government had satisfied the Fifth Amendment requirement.239 This is no
longer the case because the majority has stated a takings violation occurs at the
moment the property is taken.240 Consequentially, when an administrative body
implements a rule that constitutes a taking, the responsible actors will automatically
become constitutional violators.241
The dissent also contended the majority’s decision will flood federal courts
with state-law issues.242 The analysis of whether a taking occurs typically turns
upon complex state law and requires courts to determine the interests of the
parties and their individual property rights under such law.243 A takings analysis
is distinct from other constitutional violations which require the court only to
determine whether constitutional standards are met.244 Conversely, the analysis
of whether a constitutional violation has occurred rests first upon the underlying

233

Id. at 2187 (Kagan, J., dissenting).

234

Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting).

235

Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting).

Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting); see also Ark. Game and Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S.
23, 31 (2012).
236

237

Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2187 (Kagan, J., dissenting).

238

Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting).

239

Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting).

240

Id. at 2170.

241

Id. at 2187 (Kagan, J., dissenting).

242

Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting).

Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting F.E.R.C. v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 767, n. 30
(1982) (finding that land use regulation is “perhaps the quintessential state activity”).
243

244

Id. at 2187 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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state property rights.245 A court must examine pre-existing property rights in
order to determine whether they have subsequently been taken.246 Such local law
questions are more familiar to state courts.247

3. Overruling Williamson County Contravened the Longstanding
Doctrine of Stare Decisis
The dissent explained that deviating from stare decisis requires special
justification, which the majority’s opinion did not have.248 It stated that if
Congress can address an issue, the Court should allow a decision to stand regard
less of whether it is correct, and allow Congress to make the necessary change.249
The dissent explained Congress could address the San Remo preclusion trap with
an amendment to the Full Faith and Credit Statute.250 For this reason, it believed
the majority should have adhered to Williamson County.251 The dissent also
explained the majority erred in claiming a lack of reliance on Williamson County
as a justification for overruling the opinion.252 Reliance interests are interests in
protecting the “expectations of those who live under the law.”253 Subsequent
changes in the law might affect those who have expectations of the law and rely
upon it.254 The dissent acknowledged that individuals and governments may
not have relied on Williamson County.255 However, the principle of reliance only
enhances adherence to stare decisis, while a lack of reliance does not provide a
reason for departure from precedent.256 Thus, not only did the majority lack
justification, but stare decisis actually favored the opposite conclusion.257

245

Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting).

246

Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting).

247

Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting).

248

Id. at 2189 (Kagan, J., dissenting).

Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting); see also Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc.,
476 U.S. 409, 424 (1986); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting)).
249

250
Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2189 (Kagan, J., dissenting). See generally San Remo Hotel, L.P. v.
City and Cty. of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323 (2005); Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v.
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
251

See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2189 (Kagan, J., dissenting).

252

Id. at 2190 (Kagan, J., dissenting).

See Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine, 67 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 411,
415 (2010) (quoting Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 716 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurrence)).
253

254

Id.

255

Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2190.

256

Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 576 U.S. 446 (2015)).

257

See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2189 – 90.
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IV. Analysis and Solution
The Knick Court erred in overruling Williamson County because its
interpretations of the Takings Clause and takings precedent were incorrect.258
Its decision will lead to negative consequences: it will become impossible for
governments to avoid constitutional violations and federal courts will be flooded
with state-court litigation.259 Furthermore, the doctrine of stare decisis should
have swayed the majority from overruling precedent.260 Though it should have
left the problem to be solved by Congress, an amendment to the Full Faith and
Credit Statute is still warranted.261

A. The Court Erred in Overruling Williamson County
In Knick, the U.S. Supreme Court overruled Williamson County, which held
the Takings Clause included a state-litigation requirement.262 The Court based its
decision to overrule precedent on a mischaracterization of prior case law and a
conceptually flawed interpretation of the Fifth Amendment.263 Under the correct
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment, a plaintiff does not have a claim for which
relief can be granted until she has adhered to the state-litigation requirement.264
The Court’s decision in Knick will cause adverse consequences, including a flood
of litigation in federal courts in addition to a greater likelihood that federal, state,
and local governments will violate the Constitution.265 Additionally, the Court’s
decision to overrule Williamson County contravened the doctrine of stare decisis.266

1. The Court’s Interpretation of Takings Clause Precedent Was Incorrect
The Court erroneously interpreted prior case law to conclude there is a
violation of the Fifth Amendment at the moment the government takes property,
regardless of whether the government later grants just compensation.267 The
dissent correctly interpreted precedent when it explained the language of the Fifth
Amendment requires two elements to prove a violation: first, the government

258

See infra notes 267–351 and accompanying text.

259

See infra notes 352–71 and accompanying text.

260

See infra notes 372– 410 and accompanying text.

261

See infra notes 411–53 and accompanying text.

262

Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2167.

263

See infra notes 267–341 and accompanying text.

264

See infra notes 342–51 and accompanying text.

265

See infra notes 352–71 and accompanying text.

266

See infra notes 372–410 and accompanying text.

267

See infra notes 268–324 and accompanying text.
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must take property, and second, the government must deny just compensation.268
Because there are two elements, the government cannot violate the Takings
Clause until it takes property and denies a landowner just compensation.269 But
the majority misinterpreted takings precedent to conclude the Fifth Amendment
only requires one element.270 The majority looked to cases which have explained
when the government takes property, the property owner has a right to just
compensation upon the taking.271 In doing so, the Court concluded this right
to just compensation necessarily arises because the government violated the
Constitution.272 First, the Court misinterpreted the holding in Jacobs.273 Second,
it inaccurately analogized a Fourth Amendment claim of excessive force to that
of a Fifth Amendment takings claim.274 Third, it overstated the position the First
English Court took when looking at an earlier dissent by Justice Brennan in San
Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego.275 Fourth, the Court inaccurately held
Williamson County’s reliance on Monsanto was misplaced.276 Finally, the Court’s
decision improperly overruled decades of case law.277
First, the Court misinterpreted the holding in Jacobs.278 This case did not say
federal courts cannot require a state proceeding before the plaintiff can make a
federal claim.279 The Court in Jacobs simply determined the government needed
to pay interest on compensation for a taking.280 The Jacobs court explained,
regardless of the timing of the proceeding, the Fifth Amendment gives rise to the
takings claim and the right to just compensation at the time government took the
private property.281 Therefore, the Jacobs court concluded the government had to
compensate the property owner from the date the government took the property,
plus interest from that date.282 While the Court in Knick correctly explained the

268

See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2181 (Kagan, J., dissenting).

269

Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting). See generally United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 518 (1883).

270

See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2170–73; see also infra notes 278–324 and accompanying text.

271

See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2170 –73.

272

See id.; see also infra notes 278–324 and accompanying text.

273

See infra notes 278 –84 and accompanying text.

274

See infra notes 285–91 and accompanying text.

See infra notes 292 –99 and accompanying text; see also San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San
Diego 450 U.S. 621, 654 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
275

276

See infra notes 300 –12 and accompanying text.

277

See infra notes 313–19 and accompanying text.

See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2170 –71. See generally Jacobs v. United States ( Jacobs II ), 290 U.S.
13 (1933).
278

279
See Jacobs II, 290 U.S. at 16 (“The only question before us is as to the right to the item
of interest.”).
280

See id. at 17.

281

See id at 16 –17.

282

See id at 17.
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right to compensation arises at the moment of the taking, the Court erroneously
extended this right when it said the government violates the Constitution at that
very moment.283 Furthermore, it incorrectly held any remedy under state law
cannot restrict a federal takings claim.284
The Court also erroneously analogized the situation in Knick to a Fourth
Amendment claim of excessive force.285 Jacobs does not support this analogy.286
Jacobs merely held a property owner has a right to compensation in an amount
equivalent to what the government would have paid at the moment of the
taking, plus interest.287 Rather than holding the taking itself was prohibited,
Jacobs permitted the taking, but held the Fifth Amendment imposed the duty
to pay upon the government.288 The Fourth Amendment prohibits the use of
excessive force, meaning there is a violation of the Constitution at the moment
excessive force occurs.289 Conversely, at the moment of a taking, the government
has not yet violated the Constitution because the Fifth Amendment does not
prohibit governments from taking property—it simply imposes a limiting duty.290
Therefore, the violation occurs at the moment the governmental entity denies a
landowner just compensation.291
The Court also overstated the meaning of First English.292 First English
examined one of Justice Brennan’s dissents which supported the theory that a
constitutional violation occurs the moment the government takes property.293
However, the First English Court did not actually adopt Justice Brennan’s
stance.294 The First English Court simply found there is no difference between

283

See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2170.

284

See id. at 2171.

285

Id.

286

See Jacobs II, 290 U.S. at 17; see also Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2181 (Kagan, J., dissenting).

287

See Jacobs II, 290 U.S. at 17.

288

Id. at 16 –17.

289

See U.S. Const. amend IV.

See U.S. Const. amend V; Max Kidalov & Richard H. Seamon, The Missing Pieces of the
Debate Over Federal Property Rights Legislation, 27 Hastings Const. L.Q. 1, 25 (1999) (explaining
the state-litigation requirement is a ripeness consideration and is also an element of the cause of
action); see also Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 21 (1940) (“The Fifth Amendment
does not entitle . . . [the owner] to be paid in advance of the taking . . . .” (quoting Hurley v. Kincaid
285 U.S. 95, 104 (1932))); Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2181 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
290

See Kidalov & Seamon, supra note 290, at 25; Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2181 (Kagan,
J., dissenting).
291

292

Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2172.

San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 654 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); see also First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304,
318 (1987).
293

294

First English, 482 U.S. at 318–19.
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temporary and permanent takings.295 Accordingly, the Court in First English only
considered whether the Takings Clause requires the government to compensate
for temporary takings.296 It first recognized that any landowner’s claim for
compensation is grounded in the Constitution.297 The First English Court then
held, regardless of the action taken, the government must pay just compensation
to the owner for the entire period during which the government engaged in a
taking.298 The First English Court did not hold a violation occurs at the time
of the taking; rather, it held the obligation to pay just compensation arises at
that time.299
The Court erroneously overruled Williamson County, which relied on
Monsanto.300 The Court explained Williamson County’s reliance on Monsanto was
misplaced.301 The majority argued it was misplaced because Monsanto sought to
enjoin a federal statute, while Williamson County involved a claim that a regional
planning commission’s decision had effected a taking of plaintiff ’s property.302
Furthermore, the federal statute in Monsanto required plaintiffs to exhaust an
arbitration proceeding prior to bringing a constitutional claim.303 The Knick
Court explained Congress has the power to statutorily require plaintiffs to exhaust
administrative procedures prior to bringing a constitutional claim and, because
Williamson County did not involve such a statute, Monsanto was not applicable to
Williamson County.304 However, the reliance on Monsanto was warranted because
it did address when a takings claim may be brought, which is the same question
the Knick Court addressed.305
The Knick Court also argued that Williamson County’s interpretation of
Monsanto was incorrect.306 The Monsanto Court explained a takings claim was
premature because the plaintiff had not initiated an arbitration proceeding.307 If

295

Id. at 318.

296

Id. at 317–18.

297

Id. at 315 (referencing San Diego, 450 U.S. at 654–55 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).

298

Id. at 318–19.

299

See id. at 319.

See Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2179 (2019); Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning
Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194–95 (1985).
300

301

See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2173–74.

Id. at 2173; see Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 185; Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S.
986, 990 (1984).
302

303

Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 994–95.

304

See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2173.

See Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1013; see also Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2184–85 (Kagan,
J., dissenting).
305

306

See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2173.

307

See Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1013.
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the arbitration proceeding provided just compensation, the plaintiff would have
no takings claim.308 The majority posited that, even if the plaintiff in Monsanto
had no claim following an arbitration proceeding, it was because the constitutional
violation had been remedied, not because it had not occurred.309 However, the
Monsanto Court held that the availability of a claim for compensation, through
arbitration, precluded a claim for a constitutional violation.310 A violation does
not occur until there has been a denial of just compensation; therefore, if the
government provided just compensation, then there is no violation.311 Because
Monsanto held there was no Fifth Amendment takings violation until a denial
of compensation through the provided mechanism, Williamson County correctly
interpreted Monsanto.312
Finally, the Court’s decision to overrule Williamson County consequently
overruled decades of case law.313 In overruling Williamson County, the Court
also overruled Cherokee Nation and the subsequent cases which relied upon
its reasoning.314 Cherokee Nation held the government does not need to pay
compensation in advance of a taking, and the government’s procedure to provide
compensation after a taking is sufficient to satisfy the Fifth Amendment.315
Following Cherokee Nation, the U.S. Supreme Court repeatedly held that as
long as there is a procedure for providing just compensation, there has been
no violation of the Fifth Amendment.316 Any means the government provides
litigants to obtain just compensation is sufficient for constitutional purposes.317

308

Id. at 1013.

309

Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2173.

310

See Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1013.

311

See infra notes 325–51 and accompanying text.

See Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1013; see also supra notes 306–11 and accompanying text. The
Knick court also correctly pointed out Williamson County’s mischaracterization of the Tucker Act as
a prerequisite to a takings claim rather than as a takings claim itself. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2174. But
Williamson County only noted the federal Tucker Act as an analogy to state inverse condemnation
claims—the Court’s reasoning did not depend on the characterization of the Tucker Act. See
Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194–95 (1985).
312

313

See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2177; see also infra notes 314–18 and accompanying text.

See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2182; see also Cherokee Nation v. S. Kan. Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641,
659 (1890).
314

315

Cherokee, 135 U.S. at 659.

See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2181–83 (Kagan J., dissenting); Horne v. Dep’t of Agriculture,
569 U.S. 513, 525–26 (2013); Albert Hanson Lumber Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 581,
586– 87 (1923) (explaining that just compensation is a condition placed on the government when
it takes property). Though title of the property does not pass until compensation has been paid,
the government can take possession of the property so long as the landowner has a procedure for
obtaining just compensation. Id. at 587.
316

See generally Reg’l Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974); Yearsley v. W. A.
Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18 (1940); Hurley v. Kincaide, 285 U.S. 95 (1932); Crozier v. Fried.
Krupp Aktiensgesellschaft, 224 U.S. 290 (1912); Williams v. Parker, 188 U.S. 491 (1903).
317
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Through Knick, the Court overruled cases asserting that a takings violation does
not occur until the government denies just compensation.318 The decision to
overrule precedent requires special justification, and the Knick majority did not
provide sufficient justification.319
A correct interpretation of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause did not
warrant overruling Williamson County.320 A constitutional claim does not arise
until there has been a taking and a subsequent denial of just compensation.321 The
cases which the Knick court relies on only provide there is an obligation to pay just
compensation, not that a violation occurs at the moment the government takes
property.322 A takings plaintiff must first avail herself of the available statutory
procedure to obtain just compensation.323 Until a denial of such compensation, a
takings claim is premature.324

2. The Court’s Interpretation Was Conceptually Flawed
The Knick Court argued the Fifth Amendment’s plain meaning indicates a
violation occurs at the moment of the taking.325 This argument directly contradicts
the Court’s repeated interpretation that the Fifth Amendment does not require
advanced compensation.326 To interpret the Fifth Amendment to say a violation
occurs at the moment the government takes property would essentially require
the government to pay for any taking in advance in order to avoid violating the

318

See supra notes 278–317 and accompanying text.

See Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984) (“Although adherence to precedent is
not rigidly required in constitutional cases, any departure from the doctrine of stare decisis demands
special justification.”); see also Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory
Interpretation Methodology?, 96 Geo. L.J. 1863, 1875 (2008) (“[T]he Court may overrule its
own decisions only when there is a special justification recognized in stare decisis beyond mere
wrongness.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
319

320

See infra notes 321–24 and accompanying text.

See U.S. Const. amend V; Kidalov & Seamon, supra note 290, at 25 (explaining the statelitigation requirement is a ripeness consideration and is also an element of the cause of action).
321

See, e.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 428 U.S. 304
(1987); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984); Jacob v. United States ( Jacobs II ) 290
U.S. 13 (1933); see also supra notes 278–312 and accompanying text.
322

323

See Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1013.

324

See supra notes 267–323 and accompanying text.

325

See Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2170 (2019).

See Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 21 (1940) (“The Fifth Amendment
does not entitle . . . [the owner] to be paid in advance of the taking.” (quoting Hurley v. Kincaid,
285 U.S. 95, 104 (1932))); Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U.S. 380, 403 (1895) (The Fifth Amendment
“does not provide or require that compensation actually be paid in advance of the occupancy of the
land to be taken.”); see also Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Public Use Question as a Takings Problem, 71
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 934, 972 (2003) [hereinafter The Public Use Question]; Nicole Stelle Garnett,
Planning as Public Use?, 34 Ecology L.Q. 443, 460 (2007) [hereinafter Planning as Public Use?].
326
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Constitution.327 The Court further argued the state-litigation requirement would
render 42 U.S.C. § 1983 meaningless.328 However, the state-litigation requirement
would do the opposite—it would instead give rise to a claim under § 1983.329
First, though the Court explains its interpretation does not require advanced
compensation, it effectively does.330 If a violation occurs at the moment of taking,
as the Knick Court says it does, the government must pay compensation prior
to taking land.331 If it does not do so, the government will have committed a
violation.332 This contradicts prior case law, which states the owner of land is not
entitled to payment prior to a taking.333 Therefore, the Court’s reasoning that
advanced compensation is not required is flawed.334
The Court also incorrectly concluded the state-litigation requirement renders
42 U.S.C. § 1983 meaningless.335 The Court explained a litigant does not need
to bring a lawsuit in state court prior to a lawsuit in federal court because a
state-litigation requirement will undermine the purpose of § 1983.336 However,
a violation of the Fifth Amendment does not occur until the government denies
compensation through a state remedy.337 Landowners must first avail themselves
of the proper state procedures before a court can find the government has denied
their rights.338 When the state court denies compensation, a plaintiff has a federal

327

See infra notes 330 –34 and accompanying text.

328

See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2172–73.

See Kidalov & Seamon, supra note 290, at 52–53 (“Section 1983 requires proof of a
‘deprivation’ of a federal right. The Just Compensation Clause does not give property owners a right
to be free from governmental takings of their property for public use. Thus, such a taking does not,
standing alone, cause a ‘deprivation’ of a federal right under section 1983.”).
329

330

See infra notes 331–34 and accompanying text.

See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2170 (“[A] property owner has a claim for a violation of the
Takings Clause as soon as a government takes his property for public use without paying for it.”).
331

332

Id.

See Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 21 (1940); Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S.
95, 104 (1932) (“The Fifth Amendment does not entitle . . . [the owner] to be paid in advance of
the taking.”); see also Planning as Public Use?, supra note 326, at 460.
333

334

See supra notes 330 –33 and accompanying text.

335

See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2172–73.

336

Id.

See Kidalov & Seamon, supra note 290, at 36 (explaining the state-litigation requirement
is a ripeness consideration and is also an element of the cause of action); Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U.S.
380, 403 (1895) (The Fifth Amendment “does not provide or require that compensation actually be
paid in advance of the occupancy of the land to be taken.”); see also Yearsley, 309 U.S. at 21; Hurley,
285 U.S. at 104; supra notes 267–324, infra notes 342–51 and accompanying text.
337

338
See Kidalov & Seamon, supra note 290, at 52–53 (“Section 1983 requires proof of a
‘deprivation’ of a federal right. The Just Compensation Clause does not give property owners a right
to be free from governmental takings of their property for public use. Thus, such a taking does not,
standing alone, cause a ‘deprivation’ of a federal right under section 1983.”).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2020

31

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 20 [2020], No. 2, Art. 4

378

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 20

claim to bring pursuant to § 1983.339 Because § 1983 allows a plaintiff to bring
a claim for a violation of a constitutional right, a claim under that statute would
arise at the time the violation occurs—when compensation is denied.340 Therefore,
the state-litigation requirement would not “defeat” the purpose of § 1983; rather,
it would give rise to a claim under that statute.341

3. Prior to Satisfying the State-Litigation Requirement, A Plaintiff Has
No Claim for Relief
Courts have cast the state-litigation requirement as both a jurisdictional
and prudential ripeness rule.342 However, it is more fundamental because the
state-litigation requirement is also an element of a takings claim.343 The Court
in Williamson County treated the ripeness consideration as both a justiciability
concern and a cause of action concern.344 The Court implied that it is a
339

Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018).

340

See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018); see also supra note 337 and accompanying text.

341

See supra notes 335– 40 and accompanying text.

See Kidalov & Seamon, supra note 290, at 25–26 (“By calling exhaustion a ‘ripeness’
requirement, the Court has linked exhaustion to justiciability, of which ripeness is a component.
The justiciability doctrine reflects both Article III [(jurisdictional)] limits and ‘prudential’ rules of
judicial ‘self-governance.’ The Article III limits of the justiciability doctrine restrict[s] the power
of the federal courts . . . to decide[e] ‘cases’ and ‘controversies.’ Article III would therefore bar . . .
federal courts [from hearing] takings claims by plaintiffs who had not met Williamson’s exhaustion
requirement, if that requirement were a necessary ingredient of an Article III ‘case or controversy.’
Article III would impose no such bar, however, if the exhaustion requirement were instead
‘prudential.’”). While there are many arguments about the nuances of the ripeness consideration
of the state-litigation requirement, this paper does not discuss those. The U.S. Supreme Court
indicated a shift in the state-litigation rule from a jurisdictional requirement to a prudential rule.
See Breemer, supra note 74, at 338–39; Kidalov & Seamon, supra note 290, at 25–26. However,
when viewed as a ripeness rule, the U.S. Supreme Court should hold the state-litigation requirement
is a jurisdictional rule to prevent defendants from removing takings claims from state court only to
have them dismissed under the state-litigation requirement. See Breemer, supra note 74 at 332–37
(explaining that many takings claims are removed to federal court only to be later dismissed based
upon Williamson County); Scott A. Keller, Judicial Jurisdiction Stripping Masquerading as Ripeness:
Eliminating the Williamson County State Litigation Requirement for Regulatory Takings Claims, 85
Tex. L. Rev. 199, 219–21 (2006) (explaining that Supreme Court precedent has allowed for
removal of takings claims). If the court lacked jurisdiction, there would be no basis for removal. Id.
(explaining that if the state-litigation rule was a jurisdictional requirement, the Supreme Court was
incorrect to allow removal because it lacked jurisdiction); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2018).
342

See Gene R. Nichol, Ripeness and the Constitution, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 153, 176 (1987)
(explaining that courts can use the doctrine of ripeness to determine if a litigant has an actionable
claim); see also Katherine Mimms Crocker, Justifying a Prudential Solution to the Williamson County
Ripeness Puzzle, 40 Ga. L. Rev. 163, 177 (2014) (“Williamson County’s compensation prong can
be understood as . . . an elemental ingredient of what it takes to inflict injury under the text of the
Takings Clause . . . .”).
343

See Kidalov & Seamon, supra note 290, at 36 (explaining that the state-litigation
requirement is a ripeness consideration and also an element of the cause of action); Crocker, supra
note 343, at 176 (explaining Williamson’s ripeness requirement can be viewed as either “Article III
344
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justiciability concern because until a plaintiff exhausted state remedies, the claim
was not ripe.345 The ripeness requirement refers to the notion that until a claim is
“ripe,” a court will not hear it.346 The Court also implied that the state-litigation
requirement is an element of a Fifth Amendment takings claim; therefore, until it
is satisfied, the plaintiff does not have a cause of action.347
The notion that the state-litigation requirement is an element of a Fifth
Amendment claim has its basis in the correct interpretation of the Fifth
Amendment.348 A takings plaintiff must state a claim for which relief can be
granted, and the claim for which relief can be granted is in the language of the
Fifth Amendment—the government must not take property without providing
compensation.349 The Williamson County Court further explained that until a
plaintiff has availed herself of the state procedures and been denied compensation,
the plaintiff has “no claim” for a taking against the government.350 Therefore, until
the state-litigation element is met, a plaintiff does not have a cause of action.351

4. The Court’s Decision Will Make Constitutional Violations Inevitable
and Will Flood Federal Courts with State Issues
Aside from the majority’s erroneous reasoning, it also failed to recognize the
gravity of the adverse consequences of its decision.352 However, the dissent correctly acknowledged two consequences which will result from overruling
Williamson County: (1) well-meaning governments will inevitably become con
stitutional violators and (2) federal courts will have to address a large influx
of state-law issues.353
based” ripeness or as an element of a takings claim); Nichol, supra note 343, at 162 (explaining
one application of ripeness does not relate to jurisdictional power, but only to the actionability
of a claim). Justiciability means “[t]he quality, state, or condition of being appropriate or suitable
for adjudication by a court.” Justiciability, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). “The central
concepts . . . of justiciability . . . [include] advisory opinions, feigned and collusive cases, standing,
ripeness, mootness, political questions, and administrative questions.” Id. (emphasis added).
345

See Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985).

See Ripeness, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (“The requirement that this state
must exist before a court will decide a controversy.”).
346

See Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 194 –95 (1985); Kidalov & Seamon, supra note 290, at 36;
Crocker, supra note 343, at 176.
347

348

See supra notes 267–341 and accompanying text.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); U.S. Const. amend V; see also Kidalov & Seamon, supra note 290,
at 36–37; supra note 337 and accompanying text.
349

350
See Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 194–95; Kidalov & Seamon, supra note 290, at 36–37;
Crocker, supra note 343, at 176–77; Nichol, supra note 343, at 169.
351

See supra notes 348–50 and accompanying text.

352

See infra notes 353 –71 and accompanying text.

See Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2187 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting); see also
supra notes 233–47; infra notes 354–71.
353
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First, it will be nearly impossible for governments to implement land use
regulation without violating the Constitution.354 The holding in Knick implies
the government will have to pay advanced compensation to avoid such a
constitutional violation.355 Though a limited number of bright-line rules exist
regarding what constitutes a taking, “most takings claims turn on situationspecific factual inquiries.”356 The ways in which regulations can interfere with
property interests are limitless.357 Furthermore, there is no definite standard for
determining if a regulation reaches the level of a taking.358 Accordingly, at the
time an administrative body enacts a regulation, it is impossible to discern with
certainty whether the regulation will result in a taking.359 If a plaintiff brings a
takings claim and the court determines a regulation does effect a taking, the court
could find the government has violated the Constitution.360 Furthermore, to
satisfy the “just compensation” requirement, the government must ensure it pays
the landowner the correct amount.361 It then follows, to avoid a constitutional
violation, the government must determine two things prior to enacting any
regulation: whether the regulation will constitute a taking and the amount the
government will have to pay to fully compensate the landowner.362
Second, removing the state-litigation requirement will flood the federal
courts with state-law issues.363 Takings law begins in property law, which is
primarily a state-law concern; therefore, state courts are a more proper forum to
determine whether there has been a taking, as well as the amount of compensation

354

See infra notes 355–62 and accompanying text.

See Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2181–82 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting); see
also infra notes 356–62 and accompanying text.
355

356

Ark. Game and Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 32 (2012).

357

Id. at 31.

358

Id.

See id.; see also Steven J. Eagle, The Four-Factor Penn Central Regulatory Takings Test, 118
Penn St. L. Rev. 601, 644–45 (2014) (explaining the determination of whether a taking will occur
requires an ad hoc inquiry into numerous factors and the Court has provided little guidance on
how to apply them). An “ad hoc inquiry” refers to those cases in which the Court must look to the
specific facts and circumstances of that case to make a determination of whether there was a taking.
See Pa. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123 –24 (1978).
359

See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (“The general rule at least is, that
while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized
as a taking.”).
360

See, e.g., Gary Knapp, Annotation, Supreme Court’s View as to What Constitutes “Just
Compensation” Required, Under Federal Constitution’s Fifth Amendment, for Taking of Personal
Property for Public Use, 155 L. Ed. 2d. 1185, 2 (2012) (explaining the Supreme Court has declined
to provide a standard formula for determining just compensation).
361

362
See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2181 (Kagan, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 354– 61 and
accompanying text.
363

See infra notes 364 –71 and accompanying text.
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the government must pay.364 The U.S. Supreme Court has explained the
Constitution does not create property rights, but rather that state property laws
create property rights.365 To determine a violation of the Takings Clause, courts
must first discern the extent of a property interest under the applicable state law.366
Every regulation does not rise to the level of a compensable taking; therefore,
aside from a limited number of per se takings, each regulation is subject to an
ad hoc inquiry to determine whether it constitutes a taking.367 The court must
determine whether the plaintiff had a property right prior to the regulation, and
whether the regulation subsequently affected that right.368 Removing the statelitigation requirement opens the doors of the federal courts to hear many more
takings cases.369 Plaintiffs who were previously required to first seek compensation
in state court will now have the option to begin in federal court, thus greatly
increasing state-law issues being addressed in the federal docket.370 Such issues
364
See The Demise of Federal Takings Litigation, supra note 90, at 289–90 (“Consider an
example of differences in state law property: the rights of waterfront landowners. Oregon recognizes
customary rights in the public to cross the dry sand area between ordinary high tide and the
vegetation line. New Hampshire, by contrast, rejects customary rights altogether. Against that
background, suppose a municipality in Oregon were to prohibit construction of any structures
within one hundred feet of the mean high-water mark. If the Supreme Court were to reject a takings
challenge to that ordinance, the Court’s opinion would provide little guidance with respect to the
constitutionality of an identical ordinance enacted by a New Hampshire municipality, because the
background property law principles are so different.”); see also Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2187–88 (Kagan,
J., dissenting) (explaining it is difficult for federal courts to address state-specific property issues
and that those issues should remain in the state courts); Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S.
156, 164 (1998); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029–30 (1992); F.E.R.C. v.
Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 767 n. 30 (1982) (“[R]egulation of land use is perhaps the quintessential
state activity.”).

Phillips, 524 U.S. at 164 (“Because the Constitution protects rather than creates property
interests, the existence of a property interest is determined by reference to ‘existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.’” (quoting Bd. of Regents
v. Roth 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
365

366
See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029 (explaining that if a regulation prohibits something state law
also prohibits, it will not be a taking); Phillips, 524 U.S. at 164.
367
See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005) (“[G]overnment regulation
of private property may, in some instances, be so onerous that its effect is tantamount to a direct
appropriation or ouster—and . . . such ‘regulatory takings’ may be compensable under the Fifth
Amendment.”) (emphasis added); Pa. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978). “[A]ny law that is unconstitutional per se violates the constitution inherently and may not
be applied to any situation in a constitutionally acceptable manner.” Per se, The Wolters Kluwer
Bouvier Law Dictionary, Compact Edition 796 (Stephen Michael Sheppard, ed., 2011).
368
See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029–32 (remanding to the state court to determine if the
background principles of state property law already prohibited the uses the government sought
to regulate).
369
See Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2188–89 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (the
majority’s decision “sends a flood of complex state-law issues to federal courts”).
370
Id. at 2187– 89 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (the majority’s decision “channels to federal courts
a (potentially massive) set of cases that more properly belongs, at least in the first instance, in state
courts—where Williamson County put them. . . . [I]t makes federal courts a principal player in local
and state land-use disputes”).
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are better suited for state rather than federal courts because state courts are more
familiar with and apt to address such state-specific laws.371

5. The Court’s Decision was Incorrect Based on Stare Decisis
The majority looked to various factors to determine if it should contradict
the doctrine of stare decisis.372 These factors include: “the quality of [its]
reasoning, the workability of the rule it established, its consistency with other
related decisions, . . . and reliance on the decision.”373
The majority first explained the quality of the Williamson County Court’s
reasoning was “wrong” and “ill founded.”374 It also stated it “conflicted with
much of our takings jurisprudence.”375 The majority conflated the factors of the
quality of reasoning and the consistency with other decisions.376 It explained that
the Williamson County Court wrongly interpreted Monsanto and ignored Jacobs
and its progeny, which held that the Fifth Amendment gives a landowner the
right to compensation at the moment of taking.377 However, these assertions are
incorrect because they are based on the majority’s mischaracterizations of Jacobs,
First English, and Monsanto.378 The decisions the Williamson County Court relied
on merely held that the obligation to pay just compensation arises at the time of
the taking, not that a violation of the Fifth Amendment occurs at the moment
of the taking.379 Williamson County followed this jurisprudence when it held that
a takings plaintiff has not suffered a constitutional violation until the plaintiff
has exhausted her remedies through state-provided procedures.380 Therefore,
Williamson County’s reasoning was not flawed and did not conflict with prior
takings jurisprudence.381

371
See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029–32 (remanding to the state court to determine if the
background principles of state property law already prohibited the uses the government sought to
regulate); see also supra notes 364–368 and accompanying text.
372

Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2177–78; see also supra notes 178–201 and accompanying text.

373

Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2178.

374

Id.

375

Id.

376

Id.

377

Id.

See Jacobs v. United States ( Jacobs II ), 290 U.S. 13 (1933); First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 428 U.S. 304 (1987); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S.
986 (1984); see also supra notes 278–312 and accompanying text.
378

379

See supra notes 278 –312 and accompanying text.

See generally Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172,
194–95 (1985).
380

381

See supra notes 374–80 and accompanying text.
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Next, the majority improperly decided Williamson County was an unworkable
decision.382 The majority argued that because Williamson County and the Full
Faith and Credit Statute barred takings plaintiffs from federal court, it was
unworkable.383 However, the fact that it barred takings plaintiffs from federal court
is not sufficient to conclude the state-litigation requirement was unworkable.384
The doctrine of unworkability looks to the ease with which litigants, courts, and
others are able to interpret and apply a rule.385 A decision that is overly vague
or confusingly complex requires a court to find that precedent is unworkable.386
Conversely, a rule that is uncomplicated and clear requires a court to find that
precedent workable regardless of any undesirable effects.387 The state-litigation
requirement provided a clear rule to which litigants had adhered for many years.388
Even if the state-litigation requirement was unworkable, a problem rooted
within a statutory rule should compel courts to apply stare decisis with more
force.389 Because Congress can address such problems, the courts need not address
those problems and should adhere to stare decisis.390 In this case, the problem is
382

See infra notes 383– 88 and accompanying text.

383

See Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2178–79 (2019).

384

See infra notes 385– 88 and accompanying text.

See Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis in the Second-Best World, 103 Cal. L. Rev. 1139, 1162–63
(2015) (“Unworkability refers to the ‘mischievous consequences to litigant and courts alike’ that
can result from a vague or byzantine rule. . . . [It] deal[s] with whether courts, litigants, and other
stakeholders have been able to understand and apply the rule without undue difficulty.” (quoting
Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 116 (1965))). “The proper reasons for paying attention to
a decision’s workability are procedural in nature. . . . A rule of decision that is hopelessly convoluted
or exceedingly vague renders a precedent unworkable regardless of its substantive effect. Likewise, a
rule of decision that is unmistakably clear must be acknowledged as workable even if its substantive
effects have been disastrous.” Id.; see also Stephen Breyer, Making Our Democracy Work 152
(Alfred A, Knopf, ed.) (2010) (stating that unworkable legal rules “may have . . . created legal
conflict or otherwise caused serious harm”).
385

386

See supra note 385 and accompanying text.

387

See supra note 385 and accompanying text.

See Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n. v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194
(1985). The state-litigation requirement was again upheld twenty-eight years later. See Horne v.
Dep’t of Agriculture, 569 U.S. 513, 525 (2013).
388

See Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2189 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting); see also
South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2101 (2018) (“The [stare decisis] bar is even
higher in fields in which Congress ‘exercises primary authority’ and can, if it wishes, override this
Court’s decision with contrary legislation.”) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (quoting Michigan v. Bay Mills
Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 799 (2014)); Square D. Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc.,
476 U.S. 409, 424 (1986) (“Stare decisis is usually the wise policy because in most matters, it
is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than it be settled right. . . . This is
commonly true, even where the error is a matter of serious concern, provided correction can be had
by legislation.” (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting))).
389

See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2189 (Kagan, J., dissenting); South Dakota, 138 S. Ct. at 2101;
Square D. Co., 476 U.S. at 424; Burnet, 285 U.S. at 406.
390
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rooted within the Full Faith and Credit Statute.391 Because Congress can amend
this statute and fix the problem the Knick Court attempted to correct, the Court
should have left it to Congress.392
The majority was also wrong to conclude that because there have been no
reliance interests on Williamson County, it was justified in straying from stare
decisis.393 While the absence of reliance interests may reduce the role of stare
decisis because no one has used the precedent to serve as a “guide for lawful
behavior,” this was not enough justification for the Court to overrule Williamson
County.394 Although it may be true there are no reliance interests on Williamson
County, the lack of reliance alone is insufficient to justify overruling a case.395 The
Court has used reliance interests as a justification for adhering to precedent, but
the court should not use their absence to stray from stare decisis.396 Therefore,
because the other factors did not justify the Court in overruling precedent, the
lack of reliance interests was not sufficient to justify contradicting the doctrine of
stare decisis.397
Additionally, the majority incorrectly justified its decision to stray from
stare decisis because of the evolution of the state-litigation requirement.398 This
justification is incorrect for two reasons: first, the justification for the statelitigation requirement has not evolved, and second, evolution is not a justification

391

See supra notes 79–97; infra notes 418–20 and accompanying text.

See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2189 (Kagan, J., dissenting); see also infra notes 418–30 and
accompanying text.
392

See infra notes 394–97 and accompanying text. Reliance interests refer to whether anyone
has reasonably relied on a court’s prior decision. See generally Kozel, supra note 253, at 418.
393

United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 521 (1995); see Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808,
828 (1991) (“Considerations in favor of stare decisis are at their acme in cases involving property
and contract rights, where reliance interests are involved . . . .”). The U.S. Supreme Court has also
explained that the role of stare decisis is reduced “when the rule is not only procedural but rests
upon an interpretation of the Constitution.” Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 521. The majority argued this
was the case in Knick. See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2177. However, this does not provide justification
to overrule Williamson County, because it simply reduces the role of stare decisis. See Gaudin, 505
U.S. at 521. Because all other factors support adhering to stare decisis, this alone would not be
sufficient. See id.; see also supra notes 374 –92 and accompanying text; infra notes 398– 410 and
accompanying text.
394

See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 521; Emery G. Lee III, Overruling Rhetoric: The Court’s New
Approach to Stare Decisis in Constitutional Cases, 33 U. Tol. L. Rev. 581, 605 (2002).
395

See Alexander Lazaro Mills, Reliance by Whom? The False Promise of Societal Reliance in
Stare Decisis Analysis, 92 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 2094, 2121 (2017) (quoting Lee, supra note 395, at 605);
Breyer, supra note 385, at 152 (“[T]he public’s reliance on a decision argues strongly . . . against
overruling an earlier case.”).
396

397
See Lee, supra note 395 at 605 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 393–96 and
accompanying text.

Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2178 (2019); see also supra notes 74–78, 194 and
accompanying text.
398
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for the Court to abandon stare decisis.399 First, the Court had not changed the
justification for the state-litigation requirement until Knick.400 The majority
merely looked to the U.S. Supreme Court’s recasting of the state-litigation
requirement from a jurisdictional rule to a prudential rule as its basis for
determining the justification had evolved.401 Though the state-litigation
requirement may have developed from a jurisdictional rule to a prudential
rule, until Knick, the justification for the rule remained the same—there was
no constitutional violation until the government denied just compensation.402
Therefore, the state-litigation requirement was justified by the rule that there was
no claim to be made in federal court for a violation of the Fifth Amendment until
the government denied just compensation.403 This rule was reiterated twentyeight years after Williamson County in Horne v. Department of Agriculture when
the U.S. Supreme Court cited the state-litigation requirement.404 Further, even if
some argue that the state-litigation requirement has evolved, evolution has little
foundation in U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence as a justification for straying
from stare decisis.405 More importantly, if the evolution of the law is a justification
for overruling the law, then laws would never have legs to stand on.406 To say a
court should overrule a decision based solely on the evolution of the law justifies
the court in overruling every case.407 The law is ever-changing, hence the need for
the doctrine of stare decisis.408 A reliable judicial system and predictable outcomes
are the basis of a fair system.409 All of these theories support adhering to the
principle of stare decisis.410
399

See infra notes 400 –10 and accompanying text.

400

See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2170; see also id. at 2190 (Kagan, J., dissenting)

401

Id. at 2178.

Id. at 2170 (overruling Williamson County and holding, contrary to Williamson County,
a violation of the Takings Clause occurs at the moment the government takes private property
without providing compensation).
402

Id.; see also Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172,
194–95 (1985).
403

404

See Horne v. Dep’t of Agriculture, 569 U.S. 513, 525 (2013).

Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2190 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority’s only citation is to last
Term’s decision overruling a 40-year-old precedent.”).
405

406
See Nina Varsava, How to Realize the Value of Stare Decisis: Options for Following
Precedent, 30 Yale J.L. & Human. 62, 70 (2018) (“By providing stability of law that has been
decided, stare decisis is the foundation of a nation governed by law.” (quoting Lighting Ballast
Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F. 3d 1272, 2181 (Fed. Cir. 2014))); Daniel
A. Farber, The Rule of Law and the Law of Precedents, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 1173, 1202 (2006) (“If
precedent carried no weight, whatever the Court may say about constitutional meaning today
would be up for grabs tomorrow.”).
407

See Farber, supra note 406, at 1202–03.

408

See id.

See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (The doctrine “promotes the even
handed, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial
decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.”).
409

410

See supra notes 372– 409 and accompanying text.
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B. Congress Should Amend the Full Faith and Credit Statute to Allow
Property Owners to Bring Takings Claims in Federal Court Following
State Court Proceedings
Takings claimants’ inability to access federal courts required a remedy.411 While
the U.S. Supreme Court thought it found one when deciding Knick, its solution
was unsatisfactory.412 The Court’s interpretation of the Fifth Amendment had
been consistent for over forty years prior to Knick.413 Rather than upholding the
state-litigation requirement and requiring Knick to seek an inverse condemnation
action in state court, the Court overturned several decades of precedent.414
Instead, the Court should have decided the case consistently with precedent and
stare decisis, while simultaneously encouraging Congress to make changes.415
Although the Court did not encourage Congress in Knick, it is still imperative for
Congress to address the catch-22 scenario Knick exposed.416 This situation would
be best remedied by a legislative amendment to the Full Faith and Credit Statute
as proposed below.417

1. Proposed Amendment
This Note proposes an amendment to the Full Faith and Credit Statute. It
would appear as the fourth and final paragraph, and is reflected below in the
context of the entire statute:
The Acts of legislature of any State, Territory, or Possession of
the United States, or copies thereof, shall be authenticated by
affixing the seal of such State, Territory or Possession thereto.
The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such
State, Territory or Possession, or copies thereof, shall be proved
or admitted in other courts within the United States and its
Territories and Possessions by the attestation of the clerk and seal
of the court annexed, if a seal exists, together with a certificate of
a judge of the court that the said attestation is in proper form.

411

See supra notes 125–43 and accompanying text.

412

See supra notes 267– 410 and accompanying text.

See Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194–95
(1985). The state-litigation requirement was again upheld twenty-eight years later. See Horne v.
Dep’t of Agriculture, 569 U.S. 513, 525 (2013).
413

414

See supra notes 313–18 and accompanying text.

415

See infra notes 425–30 and accompanying text.

416

See infra notes 431–53 and accompanying text.

417

See infra notes 418 –24, 431–53 and accompanying text.
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Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so
authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every
court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions
as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory
or Possession from which they are taken.
Claims brought under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause
through the Fourteenth Amendment in State Court may
be brought anew in Federal Court, with the Federal Court
affording deference to the State Court’s factual findings and legal
conclusions regarding state-law based property interests.

2. Although Congress Should Have Amended the Full Faith and Credit
Statute Prior to Knick, Doing So Now Would Alleviate Future
Concerns and Problems Caused by Knick
The Full Faith and Credit Statute requires all courts to give a state court
decision the same effect it would have in the state court.418 In other words, this
statute requires federal courts to apply the preclusion rules prescribed by the state
in which the decision was made.419 Consequently, if the state court would have
held that there is a preclusive effect on the decision within that state, there is a
preclusive effect upon the decision in federal court, and the claim is barred in
federal court.420 Though the catch-22 should have been left to Congress, Knick’s
decision will allow many takings claimants to avoid the problem of preclusion
in federal courts by initially bringing their claims in that forum.421 However, a
statutory amendment is still warranted to alleviate federalism and uniformity
concerns, as well as future problems following the Knick decision.422 Even after
Knick, some takings claimants may still be barred from federal court because of

418

See The Demise of Federal Takings Litigation, supra note 90, at 271.

See Breemer, supra note 74, at 328; Robert H. Smith, Full Faith and Credit and Section
1983: A Reappraisal, 63 N.C. L. Rev. 59, 60 – 61 (1984). Preclusion includes the doctrines of both
issue preclusion and claim preclusion. Preclusion, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Issue
preclusion is “[t]he binding effect of a judgment as to matters actually litigated and determined
in one action on later controversies between the parties involving a different claim from that on
which the original was based.” Collateral Estoppel, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Claim
preclusion is “[a]n affirmative defense barring the same parties from litigating a second lawsuit on
the same claim, or any other claim arising from the same transaction or series of transactions and
that could have been—but was not—raised in the first suit.” Res Judicata, Black’s Law Dictionary
(11th ed. 2019).
419

420

See supra note 419 and accompanying text.

421

See Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2179 (2019).

422

See infra notes 431–53 and accompanying text.
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preclusion.423 To avoid these situations, Congress should limit the Full Faith and
Credit Statute’s preclusive effect through an amendment.424
Different text in the Full Faith and Credit Statute would have eliminated
the problems associated with the Knick Court’s decision to overrule Williamson
County.425 An amendment prior to Knick would have prevented the need to
overrule several decades of legal decisions and make an unfounded departure
from stare decisis, while also preventing far-reaching adverse consequences for
governments as well as federal courts.426 The majority in Knick contended that
such an amendment would not address the issue of the state-litigation
requirement.427 While this may be true, due to the prior jurisprudence and the
correct conceptual interpretation of the Fifth Amendment, there was no support
for the notion that a constitutional claim was available before litigants exhausted
state-provided remedies.428 Because of this, the state-litigation requirement
was necessary.429 Therefore, amending the Full Faith and Credit Statute would
have resolved the inability of plaintiffs to access federal courts following their
exhaustion of state procedures.430
The proposed amendment to the Full Faith and Credit Statute would
alleviate negative concerns and consequences following Knick.431 One reason is
that it would provide a balance between the respective involvement of the state
and federal judiciaries in takings litigation, which would mitigate federalism
concerns.432 Fifth Amendment challenges have roots in both federal and state
property law.433 This is because Fifth Amendment challenges are distinct
constitutional claims in which state law provides the background principles for
defining the property interest at issue, while federal law provides the standards

423

See infra notes 448–53 and accompanying text.

424

See infra notes 448–53 and accompanying text.

425

See infra notes 426–30 and accompanying text.

426

See supra notes 267–324, 352–410 and accompanying text.

427

See Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2179 (2019).

428

See supra notes 267–351 and accompanying text.

429

See supra notes 267–351 and accompanying text.

430

See supra notes 418 –29 and accompanying text.

431

See infra notes 432–53 and accompanying text.

See Federalism, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (“The legal relationship and
distribution of power between the national and regional governments within a federal system of
government, and in the United States particularly, between the federal government and the state
governments.”); Melvyn R. Durchslag, Forgotten Federalism: The Takings Clause and Local Land
Use Decisions, 59 Md. L. Rev. 464, 490 (2000) (explaining federalism allocates power between
the state and federal governments); The Demise of Federal Takings Legislation, supra note 90, at 288
(explaining that delegating takings cases to state courts is supported by federalism concerns); see also
infra notes 433– 41 and accompanying text.
432

433

See generally U.S. Const. amend. V; see also infra notes 434–38 and accompanying text.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol20/iss2/4

42

Nelson: Catch-22

2020

Case Note

389

under which to determine if a taking of that property interest has occurred.434 In
contrast, federal standards provide the background and principles under which to
analyze other constitutional challenges, such as Equal Protection claims.435 This
distinction is rooted in the text of the Fifth Amendment which states that “private
property must not be taken.”436 Because the text refers specifically to private
property interests and because the nature of these interests derive from state
law, a determination of the interests should rest with state courts.437 Likewise,
as the Fifth Amendment is federal constitutional law, the determination of what
constitutes a taking properly rests with the federal courts.438 An amendment to
the Full Faith and Credit Statute would allow state courts and federal courts
to make these respective determinations.439 While state courts would be left to
address complex issues of state property law, federal courts would also have an
important role to play: applying and evolving national standards for analyzing
whether there has been a constitutional violation.440 The proposed amendment
would enable federal courts to be available when needed, as anticipated by
the Williamson County Court, by allowing takings claimants to proceed to
federal court if the government denies them just compensation through stateprovided remedies.441
Another reason Congress should amend the Full Faith and Credit Statute
is to increase federal uniformity.442 Though it is the duty of the U.S. Supreme
Court to ensure federal constitutional rights are protected uniformly, the Takings
Clause entails unique protection because private property interests have roots
in state law.443 Though a federal takings standard can be prescribed uniformly,
434

See The Demise of Federal Takings Legislation, supra note 90, at 289–90.

435

Id at 288–89.

436

See U.S. Const. amend. V (emphasis added).

See Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist Dimension of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 114
Yale L. J. 203, 222 (2004) (explaining property rights are created by state law); see Lucas v. S. C.
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992) (recognizing if a regulation prohibits something state
law also prohibits, it will not be a taking). See generally Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. 590,
626 (1874) (“The state courts are the appropriate tribunals, as this court has repeatedly held, for the
decision of questions arising under their local law . . . .”).
437

See The Demise of Federal Takings Litigation, supra note 90, at 256 (“[A] municipality’s
alleged taking of private property raises a federal question, which confers jurisdiction on the
federal courts.”).
438

439

See infra notes 440 – 41 and accompanying text.

See Sterk, supra note 437, at 207 (“The primary role state law must play in policing takings
does not, however, make the Supreme Court irrelevant. First, the Supreme Court might articulate
categorical rules that address difficulties cutting across state law.”).
440

See Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2178–79 (2019) (“Williamson County
envisioned that takings plaintiffs would ripen their federal claims in state court and then, if
necessary, bring a federal suit under §1983.”).
441

442

See infra notes 443 – 47 and accompanying text.

443

See The Demise of Federal Takings Litigation, supra note 90, at 294–95; U.S. Const. amend. V.
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because of the vast differences in property rights across states, state courts’
application of the comprehensive national takings standard would vary greatly.444
Due to the large variations in state property law, a takings decision in one state
could have a different outcome in another.445 It would increase federal uniformity
and benefit both the state and federal courts if plaintiffs had the option to first
litigate in state court and then proceed to federal court if needed.446 It would
allow state courts to make determinations about the underlying private property
interests, leaving federal courts to apply the developed federal takings standard.447
Finally, the proposed amendment is still needed to prevent future takings
claimants from being subject to Knick’s catch-22.448 Even after Knick, federal
courts may be justified in invoking Pullman abstention to allow state courts to
address underlying state law questions.449 Federal courts may be tempted to apply
this doctrine with more frequency to accommodate the influx in takings cases.450
In these cases, plaintiffs may then be denied access to federal court because the
federal question may be moot or preclusion doctrines may prevent plaintiffs from
444
See Sterk, supra note 437, at 206 (“Because the constitutional standard against which
any regulation is measured must itself incorporate background state law, the Supreme Court
cannot develop a comprehensive national takings standard.”); see also supra note 364 and
accompanying text.

See Sterk, supra note 437, at 206 (“A regulation that constitutes an unconstitutional taking
in Houston could pass constitutional muster if passed in New York. Because the constitutional
standard against which any regulation is measured must itself incorporate background state law, the
Supreme Court cannot develop a comprehensive national takings standard.”).
445

446

See supra notes 443 – 45; infra note 447 and accompanying text.

See The Demise of Federal Takings Litigation, supra note 90, at 292; see also Gregory M.
Stein, Regulatory Takings and Ripeness in the Federal Courts, 48 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 16 (1995) (“The
need for concrete facts is acute in land use law, where so much litigation arises out of local ordinances
about which there may be little reported case law. With a wide variety of different municipalities
enacting land use laws and with few of these laws ever reaching the courts, those courts that are
called upon to construe these statutes and ordinances need as complete a factual record as possible,
so as to avoid making overly broad pronouncements.”).
447

448

See infra notes 449–53 and accompanying text.

See Donald H. Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach to the Enforcement of
Rights in the Federal Courts, 38 Hastings L.J. 665, 690 –91 (1987) (explaining that Pullman
abstention can be invoked when there are questions of state law and federal constitutionality, the
state law is unclear, and when a determination of the state law may obviate the need for the federal
court to rule on the federal question); see also R.S. Radford & Jennifer Fry Thompson, The Accidental
Abstention Doctrine: After Thirty Years, the Case for Diverting Federal Takings Claims to State Court
Under Williamson County Has Yet to Be Made, 67 Baylor L. Rev. 567, 597– 603 (2015) (explaining
that the Ninth Circuit invoked the Pullman Abstention doctrine broadly to abstain from hearing
takings cases). See generally Sinclair Oil Corp. v. County of Santa Barbara, 96 F.3d. 401 (9th Cir.
1996) (explaining that a determination that there was a taking under the state constitution may
render it unnecessary to determine whether there was a federal violation); Railroad Comm’n of
Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
449

See supra note 449 and accompanying text; see also Radford & Thompson, supra note
449, at 597 (explaining that, prior to Williamson County, the Ninth Circuit invoked this doctrine
frequently to avoid deciding takings cases).
450
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returning to federal court.451 Similar to the predicament exposed in Knick, these
plaintiffs would have to litigate in state court and then subsequently be barred
from returning to federal court.452 Therefore, the proposed amendment would
still allow these plaintiffs to access the federal courts by overcoming the issue
of preclusion.453

V. Conclusion
In Knick, the U.S. Supreme Court erroneously overruled Williamson County,
and with it, years of prior jurisprudence.454 It held a takings plaintiff may
bring suit in federal court without first seeking just compensation through the
procedures provided by the state.455 In doing so, the Court mischaracterized prior
decisions and incorrectly asserted that a constitutional violation occurs at the time
of taking.456 Furthermore, the Court’s interpretation of the Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause was conceptually flawed and ignored harmful consequences.457
Contrary to the majority’s interpretation, a takings violation does not occur
until the government denies just compensation.458 Therefore, a federal takings
claim does not exist until that moment.459 Additionally, the doctrine of stare
decisis favors adherence to precedent, which clearly provides that a violation of
the Constitution does not occur until the government has denied a plaintiff just
compensation.460 For these reasons, the Court should have adhered to Williamson
County and upheld the state-litigation requirement.461
While the Knick Court’s decision was erroneous, Congress could have
interceded to address the problem by amending the Full Faith and Credit
Statute.462 Had Congress done so earlier, takings plaintiffs would not have been

See generally San Remo Hotel, L.P., 545 U.S. 323, 330 (2005); see also Kathryn E. Kovacs,
Accepting the Relegation of Takings Claims to State Courts: The Federal Courts’ Misguided Attempts
to Avoid Preclusion Under Williamson County, 26 Ecology L.Q. 1, 23 (1999) (“Even if a takings
plaintiff is allowed to proceed in federal court following an England reservation and unsuccessful
state court adjudication, issue preclusion may bar litigation of the federal takings claim.”).
451

452
See supra notes 449–51 and accompanying text; see also Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct.
2162, 2167 (2019).
453

See supra notes 418–24, 448–52 and accompanying text.

454

See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2179; supra notes 267–324 and accompanying text.

455

See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2179.

456

See supra notes 278–324 and accompanying text.

457

See supra notes 325–41, 352–71 and accompanying text.

458

See supra notes 342 –51 and accompanying text.

459

See supra notes 342–51 and accompanying text.

460

See supra notes 372– 410 and accompanying text.

461

See supra notes 267– 410 and accompanying text.

462

See supra notes 411–15, 425 –30 and accompanying text.
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placed in a catch-22.463 Despite Congress’ lack of action thus far, the proposed
amendment is still warranted to address concerns raised by the Knick Court’s
decision as well as to ensure future takings plaintiffs have access to federal court.464
If Congress enacted such an amendment, a takings suit brought in state court
would not have a preclusive effect on a subsequent federal takings claim.465 The
amendment will also facilitate federalism by balancing the involvement of state and
federal courts.466 Furthermore, it will aid the courts in uniformly preserving the
rights protected under the Fifth Amendment by allowing state courts to determine
state property law while the federal courts can provide the federal standard.467 The
amendment will allow the state and federal courts to engage in their respective
roles, playing to each court’s strengths and facilitating harmony throughout the
judicial system.468 Finally, it will prevent any other takings litigants from being
subject to Rose Mary Knick’s catch-22 if federal courts are tempted to invoke
Pullman abstention to avoid deciding takings cases.469 While it is impossible to
solve the soldier’s catch-22, it is not too late to solve this one, despite the Knick
Court’s unfavorable decision.470

463
See Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2167 (2019); supra notes 425–30 and
accompanying text.
464

See supra notes 431–53 and accompanying text.

465

See supra notes 418–24 and accompanying text.

466

See supra notes 432–41 and accompanying text.

467

See supra notes 442–47 and accompanying text.

468

See supra notes 432–47 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 448–53 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 431–53 and accompanying text.
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